Morning Sessions

Read a transcript of Dr. Ratner’s keynote remarks.

10:10 am – 10:30 am: Break

11:40 am - 11:55 am: Break

Afternoon Sessions

Read a transcript of the debate.

2:40 pm - 3:00 pm: Break

The post China’s Power: Up for Debate 2023 appeared first on ChinaPower Project.

The Fujian is currently being fitted out at Shanghai’s Jiangnan Shipyard and is expected to undergo multiple rounds of sea trials in the coming months. These trials will ensure its readiness before it is commissioned into the People’s Liberation Army Navy.

Key Facts

• The Fujian will feature a “catapult assisted take-off but arrested recovery” (CATOBAR) launch system that will enable it to launch heavier and larger fixed-wing aircraft. China’s first two aircraft carriers rely on less advanced ski jump-style “short take-off, barrier-arrested recovery” (STOBAR) systems. 
• The Fujian’s catapults will be powered by an electromagnetic system similar to that of the U.S. Navy’s new Gerald R. Ford-class carriers. This represents a leapfrogging past more conventional steam-powered catapults. 
• The Fujian is larger than its predecessors, which will enable it to support a more robust airwing. It displaces roughly 80,000 tonnes, compared to the Liaoning’s 60,000 tonnes and the Shandong’s 66,000. The Fujian is also considerably larger than France’s Charles de Gaulle carrier (42,000 tonnes) and the United Kingdom’s HMS Queen Elizabeth (65,000 tonnes), but smaller than the U.S. Navy’s Ford-class carrier (100,000 tonnes). 
• While the Fujian will be more advanced than its Chinese predecessors, it will still be conventionally powered rather than nuclear-powered. Meanwhile, all U.S. carriers and France’s Charles de Gaulle are nuclear-powered.

How the Fujian Stacks Up

The table below provides a breakdown of some of the key characteristics of each of China's aircraft carriers. To lean more, explore these ChinaPower pages on the Liaoning and Shandong.

The post How Advanced Is China’s Third Aircraft Carrier? appeared first on ChinaPower Project.

In March and April 2023, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen transited through the United States, during which she met with Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy. This meeting was framed as an alternative to an immediate visit to Taiwan by Speaker McCarthy, and there were hopes that Beijing would not escalate as much as it did in August 2022 when Beijing provoked the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis after then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. 

China nevertheless carried out significant diplomatic and military measures. Diplomatically, Beijing intensified some of its already-sharp measures aimed at punishing Taipei, while simultaneously softening its approach on other fronts. Militarily, China’s activities were substantively different from those in August 2022, but no less significant. Overall, Beijing appears to have taken a less heavy-handed, more targeted approach this time, suggesting it learned from its experience in August and was better postured to take action. 

China’s More Sophisticated Diplomatic Approach

China’s diplomatic activities took a two-track approach, with some measures aimed at ramping up pressure on Taipei and others aimed at softening China’s approach. This represents a considerable shift from August, when Beijing’s activities were overwhelmingly punitive. It also shows a more sophisticated use of multiple efforts in tandem. 

The analysis on this page draws from ChinaPower research tracking China’s major military and diplomatic activities in response to Tsai’s transit and meeting with Speaker McCarthy. Explore a detailed timeline of Chinese activities here.

EXPLORE

Two Chinese diplomatic activities stand out in comparison to August 2022. First, Beijing appears to have timed a 12-day visit to China by former Taiwan president Ma Ying-jeou to coincide with Tsai’s transit and meeting with Speaker McCarthy. This was the first time a former or sitting Taiwan president had traveled to mainland China. As President, Ma endorsed the “1992 consensus” and encouraged greater cross-strait engagement, and as a result, Chinese leaders have been far more willing to engage with Ma and the Kuomintang (KMT) party that he previously led. 

Ma’s visit to China contrasted starkly with Tsai’s transit through the United States. China likely encouraged Ma’s visit to demonstrate that it is willing to engage with China-friendly parties such as the KMT—even as it engaged punitively to President Tsai and her ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). 

Beijing’s second major diplomatic maneuver came a few days before the start of Tsai’s U.S. transit, when China poached one of Taiwan’s few remaining diplomatic partners, Honduras. China reportedly offered Honduras up to $2.95 billion to establish diplomatic relations with China. This is the ninth time China has enticed a country to switch diplomatic ties from Taiwan to China during Tsai’s presidency, and it marks the second time China has poached one of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners around the time of a U.S. transit. In 2018, China established ties with El Salvador a few days after Tsai returned to Taiwan after transiting through the United States. Beijing likely did this again and timed its actions as a demonstration of its influence and power. 

On other fronts, China took measures in April that were similar to those taken in August 2022. China commonly uses disinformation to put pressure on Taiwan, so it is unsurprising that it did so in both August 2022 and April 2023. Ahead of Speaker Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan, a Chinese group reportedly published articles condemning her visit and used fake Taiwan news sites to argue that the United States would not be a reliable partner in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Chinese actors also launched several cyberattacks in August, including changing signs and screens to display anti-U.S. messages. In April, China again launched disinformation campaigns, with much of these efforts targeting President Tsai. During her transit of the United States, Chinese consulates in the United States reportedly organized and paid pro-China demonstrators to protest outside of Tsai’s hotels and venues. These protests were in turn amplified by Chinese netizens who also falsely claimed that Tsai had paid the Hudson Institute to present her an award. 

Mirroring its actions in August, Beijing also punished multiple U.S. and Taiwan organizations and individuals this April. Both U.S. institutions that hosted Tsai—the Hudson Institute and the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library—were sanctioned. For a second time, China also sanctioned Taiwan representative to the United States Hsiao Bi-khim, as well as her family and investors and firms tied to her. After Tsai’s transit concluded, Chairman of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee Michael McCaul met with Tsai in Taiwan, and shortly after that, China announced sanctions on McCaul as well. Beijing used these sanctions to engage in targeted coercion. They allow Beijing to show domestic and foreign audiences that it is enacting punishments, but they have little or no tangible effect on the wider public in Taiwan or the United States. 

China likewise repeated its use of punitive arrests of Taiwan citizens as an additional show of power against Taiwan. Chinese authorities announced on April 25 the formal arrest of Taiwan pro-independence activist Yang Chih-yuan. Yang was originally detained in August 2022 in the immediate aftermath of Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. The formal confirmation of his arrest appears intentionally timed to coincide with the Tsai-McCarthy meeting. Adding to that, the Chinese government confirmed on April 26 the arrest of Li Yanhe, a Taiwan-based publisher. Given that there were no other high-profile arrests of Taiwan citizens between August and April, this too should be seen as intended by Beijing to showcase its displeasure over the Tsai transit. 

China’s other major diplomatic steps varied from last year. Beijing did not announce major new diplomatic “countermeasures” against Washington, as it did in August when it cancelled or suspended eight key areas of U.S.-China dialogue. Whether this should be viewed as a sign of restraint on China’s end is unclear. It could be that there were few remaining areas of U.S.-China engagement to target—seven of the eight key areas of U.S.-China dialogue that China canceled and suspended in August have yet to resume.¹ Instead, China has been reluctant to engage in dialogue with the United States at the highest levels. Beijing has yet to respond to the U.S. request to arrange a phone call between President Biden and President Xi. This request was made public in mid-March after newspapers revealed initial U.S. plans for the Tsai transit. 

On the economic front, Beijing embraced additional measures In August 2022, China suspended imports of Taiwan fish and fruits and cut exports of sand to the island, though these had limited economic impacts on Taiwan. China stopped short of suspending imports or exports of specific goods in April 2023, but it did take some measures: on April 12, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced it was launching an investigation into Taiwan’s trade restrictions on certain Chinese goods. Importantly, the ministry’s notice stated that the investigation should conclude by October 12, 2023, but added that it could be extended until January 12, 2024—the day before Taiwan’s presidential election. Depending on how political dynamics evolve, experts are concerned that China may use the investigation to impose additional economic sanctions or change or cancel parts of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement that China and Taiwan signed in 2010 to facilitate trade. 

At the same time, however, China continued to signal a desire to increase cross-strait linkages. On April 10—the last day of China’s major military exercises—Wang Huning, the fourth-ranked member of the Chinese Communist Party’s all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee, met with a delegation of Taiwan business executives in Beijing. During the meeting, he called for improved economic and trade exchanges as a means of promoting peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. 

China’s Significant Military Escalation

On the surface, China’s April 2023 military activities differed substantively compared to those in August 2022. Some of the more provocative activities from the 2022 exercise—such as launching missiles over Taiwan and establishing military exercise exclusion zones around the island—were not carried out again in 2023. However, the latest round of military activities also showed considerable continuity and even progression with respect to PLA operations, tactics, and reach. Overall, China’s military activities were no less significant in April 2023 than in August 2022, with both exercises demonstrating the range of capabilities that the PLA is practicing against Taiwan. 

Military Signaling Prior to the Main Exercises

The PLA’s primary activities began on April 8, with the start of large-scale exercises around Taiwan, but Chinese military signaling began days before that while President Tsai was transiting the United States. On April 5, the Fujian Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) announced a joint patrol and inspection operation of the Taiwan Strait. As part of this operation, Chinese maritime law enforcement officials were tasked with conducting “on-site inspections” (现场检查) aboard vessels in the Taiwan Strait. 

The operation is significant in multiple respects. First, although there is no evidence that the operation actually stopped any vessels, it laid out an example of what China could do if it wanted to escalate. The intended “targets” of this operation encompassed several commercial shipping routes, including the Pingtan-Taiwan direct container route, the “mini three links” (小三通), and areas with heavy commercial and fishing vessel traffic.²This, coupled with changes in Chinese maritime safety regulations, allows China to set conditions for an escalatory stance in the Taiwan Strait and around Taiwan. It also reflects another effort to assert Beijing’s claims (which contradict international law) that China has “sovereign rights and jurisdiction” over the “internal waters” of the Taiwan Strait. Finally, the operation demonstrated China’s civilian mobilization capabilities and its capacity for operational coordination of civilian maritime actors in support of a joint operation. 

Next, Chinese authorities released several announcements of multiple smaller-scale live-fire military exercises. On April 7, the Fujian MSA announced two series of live-fire drills north and south of Taiwan’s outlying Matsu Islands. These were scheduled to occur during and after the main military exercises; however, both of these announcements were later removed from the MSA website, resulting in uncertainty about the extent to which these exercises took place. Around this same time, military drills were announced at other locations, including multiple exercises off the coast of Liaoning Province (well to the north of Taiwan). 

While there are few details about these drills, the flurry of announcements in a short time frame and the variety of locations of the drills are likely all part of the PLA’s overall activities aimed at countering the Tsai transit and meeting with Speaker McCarthy. Together, they served as a show of force and emphasized not only China’s ability to carry out several military activities at once, but also its ability to conduct operations in geographically dispersed areas farther from Taiwan. 

Comparing China's April 2023 and August 2022 Exercises

Following these initial activities, the PLA Eastern Theater Command announced that from April 8 to 10, it would “organize combat readiness patrols around Taiwan Island and conduct ‘Joint Sword’ exercises in the Taiwan Strait, around the northern and southern parts of Taiwan Island, and in the sea and airspace to the east of Taiwan Island.” These exercises were the centerpiece of China’s April 2023 military activities and were reminiscent of the large-scale August 2022 exercises. 

At first glance, some aspects of these exercises suggest an overall scaled-back military demonstration of force compared to August. The April Joint Sword exercises lasted three days, while the August exercises were scheduled for four days and later extended to seven. Perhaps most importantly, the April exercises lacked the highly provocative live-fire ballistic missile launches seen in August. On August 4, 2022, the PLA Rocket Force took the unprecedented step of firing multiple ballistic missiles over Taiwan and into the waters around the island. Five of these fell into Japan’s exclusive economic zone. In April 2023, the PLA primarily focused on simulating joint precision strikes on and around Taiwan, and the Rocket Force did not fire ballistic missiles near or over the island. 

Another key difference was the amount of information released about the drills. Two days before the start of the August 2022 exercises, Chinese authorities released the coordinates for six distinct exercise exclusion zones encircling the island (and later announced a seventh zone). This allowed for a direct comparison to the exclusion zones that were mapped out during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. In April 2023, the PLA did not announce specific coordinates for its main exercises and commenced the exercises the same day they were announced, providing no advance warning. 

The PLA’s decision to provide less information this time is significant for a few key reasons. First, it could be an indicator that Chinese leaders do not believe they need to pre-notify Taiwan or the international community regarding operations near or around Taiwan. Second, it likely reflects Beijing’s desire to prevent external interference by not showing where its forces could operate. Finally, it suggests more confidence in the PLA’s control of air and naval assets to operate around Taiwan without creating inadvertent hazards. It is likely that China will try to set a new norm of increased military operations around Taiwan without prior notification or announcement. 

Looking to go deeper on the military dimensions of China's April 2023 response? The China Power Project hosted a live event on this topic, featuring a panel of top experts. Watch a recording of the event here.

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Despite these differences, the April exercises were no less significant than those in August. There were several areas of continuity between the two, as well as substantial new elements. Fundamentally, both the August and April exercises were suggestive of an “encirclement” of Taiwan using PLA Navy forces, with the objective of rehearsing elements of a potential blockade and other kinetic military operations against Taiwan. 

PLA forces were roughly as active around Taiwan this April as they were last August. Information released by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) shows that, like in August, PLA vessels surrounded the island. The MND reported a single-day maximum of 12 vessels on April 10, close to the one-day high of 14 seen in August. Crucially, Taiwan’s MND also released maps indicating that, during the exercises, PLA vessels encircled the island in ways reminiscent of the August exercises. 

With respect to air activities, the April exercises surpassed the peak of activity during the August exercises. On the last day of the Joint Sword exercises (April 10), Taiwan’s MND reported that 91 PLA aircraft were operating around Taiwan. This marked an all-time high up to this point and was considerably higher than the highest one-day total during the August 2022 exercises (66 aircraft). During the April exercises, the PLA also averaged higher daily incursions into the air defense identification zone (ADIZ), as well as incursions and crossings of the Taiwan Strait median line. However, it is worth noting that PLA air activity in April spiked higher and then subsided more quickly than in August. 

PLA air and maritime activity around Taiwan is aimed at negating Taiwan’s ADIZ, and the Taiwan Strait median line and is on track to increasingly challenge Taiwan’s contiguous zone. Incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ ramped up in 2020 and have become a near daily occurrence. Prior to the August exercises, there were only a handful of reported instances of PLA aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait median line, but China ramped up crossings in August, and this now occurs frequently. Similarly, PLA navy vessels rarely came close to Taiwan’s contiguous zone—a boundary extending 24 nautical miles beyond Taiwan’s territorial baseline—in August, but China reportedly sent multiple vessels right up to Taiwan’s contiguous zone during the April exercises. 

On top of that, the April 2023 exercises saw far more activity from one of China’s aircraft carriers. In the days leading up to the August 2022 exercises, the PLA Navy’s two operational aircraft carriers, the Liaoning and Shandong, deployed from their respective home ports of Qingdao and Sanya and moved in the waters around China as a show of force, but they were not integral to the exercises taking place around Taiwan. 

By comparison, China’s Shandong aircraft carrier and its carrier group played a primary role in April 2023. The carrier stayed in the waters east of Taiwan for several days before, during, and after the Joint Sword exercises. The Japan Ministry of Defense (JMOD) reported that the Shandong launched a total of 620 sorties between April 7 and 24, including both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. During the exercises, a total of 19 carrier-based J-15 fighters entered Taiwan’s southeast ADIZ—the first time those aircraft have been reported in Taiwan’s ADIZ. Many more carrier-launched sorties occurred near Taiwan (outside of the ADIZ), but there is no data available on the specific amount. Although it is far from certain that China would risk deploying the Shandong or any of its aircraft carriers to such a vulnerable location east of Taiwan in an actual conflict, the carrier operations signaled China’s intent and its efforts to practice capabilities to operate near and attack Taiwan’s east coast. 

Access to Taiwan’s east coast is critical to the island’s defense. Military bases located on the island’s east side are key to force preservation, and the island has long sought the option of moving military assets to the east for protection during the onset of a potential PLA attack or invasion. Given the likely intense fighting in the Taiwan Strait in a cross-strait conflict, access to Taiwan’s bases to the east could provide the easiest way for the United States and allies to flow forces or supplies to Taiwan. This is not lost on China. A researcher at China’s Academy of Military Sciences, Zhao Xiaozhuo, emphasized that the carrier group “played a vital role” in showing the PLA’s ability to project power on Taiwan’s east, which would be crucial to deterring foreign intervention in a Taiwan Strait conflict. 

Along with significant naval activity around Taiwan, April also showed an uptick in PLA vessels operating near Japan, according to JMOD reports. Around the time of the August exercises, the JMOD reported seven PLA vessels operating near Japan in the weeks before the exercises, but only one vessel—a Type 052D destroyer—during the period of the exercises. 

By comparison, in the two weeks before and after the start of the April 2023 drills, the JMOD reported 19 distinct PLA vessels near Japan, five of which were tracked around Japan for more than 12 days and three of which were repeatedly tracked for 17 or more days. Some of these vessels included the Shandong and its carrier group, but there were also several other vessels operating separately in the waters on all sides of Japan. This increased PLA activity around Japan was likely intended as a warning and signal to Japan given Tokyo’s heighten concerns that a conflict in Taiwan will negatively impact Japan’s security, as well as its increased military investment and preparations to deal with such contingencies. 

Continued Signaling After the Military Exercises

China’s military signaling continued after the end of the Joint Sword exercises. On April 12, Taiwan’s Ministry of Transportation and Communication revealed that on the preceding day, China privately notified Taiwan that it would close an area of airspace north of Taiwan due to “aerospace activities” related to the launch of an orbital rocket into space. This zone was situated just 85 nautical miles from Taiwan’s northern coast, extended into Taiwan’s ADIZ, and spanned a busy route for air traffic in the region. 

China initially warned against aircraft entering the zone from 9 a.m. to 2 p.m. on April 16–18. This lengthy period sparked anger, with officials in Taiwan calling it “unprecedented” and Chinese authorities later reducing the airspace closure window to only 27 minutes on April 16. China further muddied the waters when the Fujian MSA announced the closure of the zone to maritime vessels from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m. on April 16. When April 16 finally came, China reported it had successfully launched a meteorological satellite on a Long March-4B rocket, and debris from the launch was later detected in the announced zone. 

This episode resulted in confusion and left many unanswered questions. It is not clear why China did not initially acknowledge the closure zone until it was reported by authorities in Taiwan. It is also unclear why the initial three-day window was later shortened to just 27 minutes on one day. This backtracking and lack of clarity may have been the result of poor internal coordination, but the episode was widely seen as part of China’s campaign to pressure and intimidate Taiwan. It is also worth noting that the original time frame overlapped with the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting that was taking place in Japan. 

Click to enlarge.

On top of that, President Xi Jinping played a role in military messaging when he traveled to the PLA’s Southern Theater Command to inspect the readiness of its naval forces. During his inspection on April 11, Xi stated that the PLA should “analyze and address military issues from a political perspective” and called for the military to “resolutely defend China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests and strive to maintain the overall stability of the country’s neighboring regions.” 

Xi also emphasized driving forward the modernization of PLA forces and doctrine, and in a nod to the recent military exercises, he called for the PLA to “intensify force-on-force training based on operational plans.” Xi’s visit and his statements showcase that he believes the PLA plays a crucial role in overall efforts to increasingly exert control over Taiwan through coercive and kinetic means. 

Taken together, China’s military escalation in April should be seen as a continuation of efforts to intimidate Taiwan and allow the PLA to practice a variety of operations around Taiwan. While its activities in April were different in important respects from those in August, they were no less significant. 

Factors Shaping China’s Overall Escalation

It is not exactly clear how and to what extent certain factors shaped the intensity and contours of China’s overall behavior, but a number of initial observations are possible. 

While Chinese leaders likely felt domestic pressure to take action to oppose the transit, it is not clear they faced the same level of pressure as they did in August 2022. There was significantly less coverage of the Tsai transit on Chinese media and social media compared to then-speaker Pelosi’s August trip, when Weibo crashed around the time Pelosi was about to land in Taiwan and many netizens in China were tracking her flight to the island. It is possible that the Chinese public were either generally less aware or less interested in the transit or that Beijing did a better job of controlling public expression of views. This could have created more space for Beijing to act as it sees fit.  

After Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022, China engaged in significantly escalatory activities, but this resulted in substantial diplomatic backlash. This likely influenced Beijing’s thinking this time, and it sought to achieve its objectives while reducing backlash. This aligns with Beijing’s use of more sophisticated diplomatic efforts—namely Ma Ying-jeou’s visit to China and the poaching of Honduras from Taiwan—which put pressure on Taipei and showcased Beijing’s willingness to work with China-friendly elements in Taiwan. 

It is also possible that China acknowledged U.S. and Taiwan efforts to try to address some of Beijing’s concerns and aimed to craft a set of countermeasures to the Tsai transit visit that was proportional to what Beijing viewed as the level of Taiwan and U.S. “provocativeness.” Beijing closely monitored Tsai’s transit and likely recognized that certain elements of Tsai’s transit were scaled down to reduce the profile and public nature of her engagements. Beijing might have also appreciated the attempt by Washington and Taipei to at least delay a Tsai-McCarthy meeting in Taiwan by offering McCarthy a chance to meet in the United States. If that is the case, it suggests that China will continue to escalate against future high-profile meetings between senior U.S. and Taiwan officials but will adjust the level of its activities based on its perceptions of the meeting’s dynamics. 

Want to learn more about China’s activities related to Speaker Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan? Explore our feature here.

EXPLORE

Importantly, Chinese decisionmaking does not occur in a vacuum, so other geopolitical factors play a role. In recent months, Beijing has accelerated diplomatic efforts and sought to improve China’s international image. China’s continued support for Russia throughout the war in Ukraine has led to a considerable fraying of China-Europe relations. As part of Beijing’s efforts to restore ties with the region, President Emmanuel Macron of France and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen were in China from April 5 to 7 to meet with President Xi. 

A significant Chinese escalation during their visit would have undercut Beijing’s efforts to smooth over tensions with Europe. Beijing appears to have waited until the departure of Macron and von der Leyen (and Ma Ying-jeou) to announce some key parts of its activities, including small live-fire exercises near Taiwan’s outlying Matsu Islands (which were announced the day that they left China), as well as the large-scale exercises around Taiwan (which were announced and started the following day). 

Broader geopolitical trends may have also factored into Beijing’s calculus in its actions toward the United States and its allies. Around the same time as the Tsai transit, China targeted several major U.S. companies amid mounting economic and technological competition. On March 31, Japan announced restrictions on exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China in a crucial move to support sweeping export controls issued by the Biden administration in the fall of 2022. On the same day as Japan’s announcement, the Cyberspace Administration of China announced a “cybersecurity review” of U.S. chip manufacturer Micron Technologies in apparent retaliation. Beijing has targeted other U.S. companies as well. On March 24, officials raided the Chinese offices of U.S. due diligence firm Mintz Group and on April 28, officials questioned staff at the Shanghai office of U.S. consulting firm Bain & Company. China also reportedly slowed its review process of proposed mergers and acquisitions of U.S. companies. 

These moves are not explicitly part of Beijing’s countermeasures against the Tsai transit, but they likely factor into Beijing’s thinking. Amid heated U.S.-China tensions, Beijing regularly employs measures against the United States in the context of overall tensions and competition, and Chinese officials likely calibrated their actions against the Tsai transit to factor in action along other vectors. Thus, the absence of harsh diplomatic or economic retaliation against the United States after the transit may reflect the fact that China has already taken—or was planning to take—actions against the United States unrelated to the Tsai transit. 

Finally, the approaching 2024 Taiwan presidential election also factors into Beijing’s calculus. President Tsai and the DPP have successfully leveraged past Chinese aggression to their electoral benefit. Most notably, China’s 2019 crackdown in Hong Kong severely worsened perceptions of Beijing among the Taiwan public, which aided the DPP in the 2020 presidential elections. This April, China avoided engaging in some of the activities that would affect Taiwan as a whole—such as suspending trade of certain goods and launching ballistic missiles over the island—but still demonstrated the range of military options China has against the island. At the same time, it embraced measures to directly efforts pressure President Tsai and the DPP ahead of the elections. 

China’s decision to invite Ma Ying-jeou to China at this time was a key part of this. Ma’s trip to China, and his talking points after the trip, likely helped Beijing message to the Taiwan people that Beijing is open to working with leaders in Taipei. It was also meant to show that working with Beijing will bring Taiwan peace and prosperity, while pushing for Taiwan independence will create crises and conflict. Beijing’s messaging sets the stage for how to interpret Chinese actions toward Taiwan and does not rule out the possibility of another major escalation between now and January 2024 if Beijing perceives Taipei is embracing more “pro-independence” actions. 

Overall, Beijing’s escalation against the Tsai transit showcases a China that is learning from its past actions and adapting its countermeasures based on how it assesses the level of “provocativeness” of Taiwan and U.S. activities. China also appears to be sensitive to the potential costs of its actions and is seeking to advance China’s claims over Taiwan using more sophisticated means beyond just punitive measures. Beijing demonstrated its willingness to take firm and escalatory measures vis-à-vis Taiwan, and it is likely to continue to do so in the future. 

Authors:
Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Samantha Lu, Hannah Price, Matthew Slade

The post Analyzing China’s Escalation after Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s 2023 U.S. Transit appeared first on ChinaPower Project.

In late March and early April 2023, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen transited through the United States and held an in-person meeting with Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began increasing its activities as Tsai was in the United States and particularly after her meeting with McCarthy. On April 8, the day after Tsai arrived back in Taiwan, the PLA announced and launched large-scale military exercises around Taiwan. These exercises are more significant than China’s responses to past Taiwan presidential transits, and they are reminiscent of the unprecedented PLA response to then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022.  

In contrast to China’s major show of military force, Beijing has taken relatively less direct diplomatic and economic measures to punish Taiwan and the United States since April 2. China issued four strong statements denouncing the transit and meeting with McCarthy on April 6 and sanctioned a handful of U.S. and Taiwan entities afterwards. On April 10, China signaled desire to deepen economic and other exchanges with Taiwan. What remains to be seen is how former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou’s trip to China will impact domestic politics in Taiwan—a trip that was likely encouraged and at least partially orchestrated by Beijing. For example, Beijing likely welcomed Ma’s remarks to the press on April 7 after he returned to Taiwan – Ma characterized Taipei’s current leadership and policy as one leading Taiwan towards danger and war and warned that Taiwan has a choice between peace and war.  

This page tracks and analyzes key activities China has taken so far, starting April 2, the week of Tsai’s meeting with Speaker McCarthy. The timelines below reflect information available through April 30, 2023.¹ This page will be updated with additional analysis and new information as it becomes available. Use the table of contents below to jump to a section of the page.

Background

The meeting between President Tsai and Speaker McCarthy was framed as an alternative to an immediate visit by Speaker McCarthy to Taiwan—at least postponing his intended travel to the island. By having Tsai and McCarthy meet during an unofficial transit of the United States, there were hopes that Beijing would not escalate as much as it did when Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022. 

China used the visit by Speaker Pelosi to provoke the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, which included unprecedented military exercises around the island. Compared to the previous Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996, the August 2022 exercises were closer to the main island of Taiwan—with some of the exercise zones extending into Taiwan’s territorial waters. The PLA Rocket Force also fired multiple ballistic missiles over the main island of Taiwan, with some of them landing into the exclusive economic zones of Japan and the Philippines. Beijing also embraced limited economic punishments against Taiwan and canceled and postponed select areas of U.S.-China engagement and cooperation. 

Want to learn more about China’s activities related to Speaker Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan? Explore our feature here.

EXPLORE

Timeline of Key Chinese Military and Related Activities

Sunday, April 2 

• The PLA Eastern Theater Command reported that it sent the Type 054A frigate Xiangtan, Type 052D guided-missile destroyer Taiyuan, and Type 956EM destroyer Taizhou to conduct live-fire combat exercises in the East China Sea.  
• It was reported that a combined arms brigade of the PLA Ground Force based in Guangdong received a large delivery of Type 08 wheeled armored vehicles, which are necessary for “rapid-reaction combat including rapid deployment and mobilized assault missions.”  
• According to an announcement by the Liaoning Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), military exercises in the Yellow Sea and Bohai region began on April 2 and continued through April 9.

Monday, April 3 

• It was reported that the Hainan, a Type 075 amphibious assault ship, carried out a joint sea-air exercise in waters to the west of China’s Guangdong Province. Official Chinese media directly linked this and other exercises to Tsai’s planned meeting with McCarthy.
• The Hainan MSA announced live-fire exercises would be held in an area off of the island’s northeastern coast from April 4–6.  

Tuesday, April 4 

• 14 PLA aircraft and 3 naval vessels were detected around Taiwan by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND). Two of the detected aircraft entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ. 
• It was reported that a combined arms brigade under the PLA 72nd Group Army held a combat-oriented beach assault exercise. The 72nd Group Army is an amphibious force that is responsible for cross-sea landing missions. 
• Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force observed the Type 052C destroyer Changchun sailing northwest through the waters between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan on April 4. It then sailed northward through waters approximately 70 km west of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands on April 5. The vessel had previously sailed south through the waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island on April 3.

Wednesday, April 5 

• China announced a three-day “special joint patrol and inspection operation” in the central and northern areas of the Taiwan Strait. As part of this operation, Chinese maritime law enforcement officials were tasked with conducting on-site inspections (现场检查) aboard vessels in the Taiwan Strait, but there were no reports of such on-site inspections taking place. The operation was led by China’s first large-scale patrol vessel in the Taiwan Strait, the Haixun 06. Vessels from the Fujian Maritime Safety Administration, East China Sea Rescue Bureau and the East China Sea Maritime Security Center joined. Notably, the first law enforcement patrol the Haixun 06 embarked on occurred during then-Speaker of the House Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. In response to Haixun 06’s April 2023 operations, Taiwan’s Maritime and Port Bureau issued a statement that relevant shipping companies have been told to refuse these inspections.  
• The PLA Navy’s Shandong aircraft carrier passed through the Bashi Channel and into waters off of Taiwan’s southeastern coast for long-range training in the West Pacific. Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the Shandong was accompanied by the Type 054A frigate Liuzhou and the Chaganhu, a Type 901 fast combat support ship. The ships traveled eastward in an area 186 miles south of Hateruma Island. Japanese guided-missile destroyer Sawagiri shadowed the carrier group. Notably, the USS Nimitz aircraft carrier was sailing about 400 nautical miles east of Taiwan that day.  
• A PLA news site reported that a vessel-borne helicopter regiment affiliated with the PLA Eastern Theater Command Navy carried out landing exercises during both day and night on the Type 075 amphibious assault ship Guangxi over several days.  
• Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force observed the Type 054A frigate Anyang sailing northwest in the waters between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan on April 5. It then sailed northward through the waters between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, and then sailed northward through the waters approximately 80 km west of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands on April 6. The vessel had previously sailed south through the waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako on April 3.  

Friday, April 7 

• The Fujian MSA announced that live-fire drills would be held off the northern coast of Pingtan Island on April 10 for 13 hours. The exercise zone covers an area of approximately 39 square kilometers (15 square miles). At its closest point, the exercise zone is approximately 30 kilometers (19 miles) from Dongju Island, the southernmost island of Taiwan’s Matsu Islands. However, the announcement was later removed from the MSA website, raising questions about whether the exercises took place.  
• The Fujian MSA also announced live-fire drills would be held in Luoyuan Bay, northwest of Taiwan’s Matsu Islands. The drills were scheduled from 8 am – 12 pm on April 8, 11, 13, 15, 17, and 20. However, the announcement was later removed from the MSA website, raising questions about whether the exercises took place or will later in April.  
• Japan’s MoD reported that China’s Shandong aircraft carrier and its escort ships were approximately 242 miles (390 km) south of the Japanese island of Miyako. 
• The Liaoning MSA announced three military exercises that would occur in the Yellow Sea and Bohai Sea. Exercises were scheduled for 8 hours on April 8 and 10 hours on April 9. Immediately following the April 9 exercise, another exercise would begin that same day, from April 9 to April 16.

Saturday, April 8 

• At 8:16 am Beijing time, the PLA Eastern Theater Command (ETC) announced that from April 8–10, it would “organize combat readiness patrols around Taiwan Island and conduct “Joint Sword” exercises in the Taiwan Strait, around the northern and southern parts of Taiwan Island, and in the sea and airspace to the east of Taiwan Island.” At 10:01 am, the ETC repeated the announcement, adding that the exercises are “a serious warning against ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces’ collusion and provocation with external forces, and a necessary action to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” The exercises involved joint operations across the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Forces.  
• On the first day, the exercises focused on testing the PLA’s capability to seize control of sea, air, and information domains under the support of the joint combat system. PLA Navy frigates and destroyers practiced short-range assaults, long-range deterrence, and air defense and anti-missile drills. There were also joint anti-submarine drills with cooperation from police patrol boats. Dozens of J-16 and J-10C fighters carried out live ammunition and medium and long range air combat drills with the support of early warning aircraft, jammers, and refueling aircraft. PLA Rocket Force conventional missile brigades were also dispatched. 
• As part of the exercises, the Type 052D destroyer Taiyuan reportedly came within 24 nautical miles of Taiwan Island—the point where Taiwan’s contiguous zone starts. This suggests Chinese vessels are operating increasingly close to the island; however, there are no reports of vessels entering Taiwan’s territorial waters (which extend 12 nautical miles from Taiwan’s territorial baseline).    
• Taiwan’s MND reported that by 11 am, 42 PLA aircraft and 8 vessels were detected in areas around Taiwan. Later, Taiwan’s MND reported a total of 71 aircraft and 9 vessels around Taiwan. Up to this point, this was by far the highest figure reported in 2023, and tied for the highest ever recorded.² Of these, 45 aircraft crossed the southern, central, and northern areas of the Taiwan Strait median line and entered into the southwest ADIZ.  
• Japan’s MoD reported that the Shandong was over 267 miles (430 km) south of Miyako Island. 
• Reportedly, a PLA amphibious landing ship carried out live-fire exercises just 30 miles (50 km) northwest of the Matsu Islands in the Luoyuan Bay. The vessel “fired shells at targets on land and at sea.” This aligned with an April 7 announcement by the Fujian MSA of a series of exercises over several days in the area.

Sunday, April 9 

• China continued with large-scale exercises around the island. According to a CCTV report, “Under the unified command of the theater’s Joint Operations Command Center, multiple types of units carried out simulated joint precision strikes against key targets on Taiwan Island and the surrounding waters, and continued to maintain the momentum of encircling the island.” 
• As part of the exercise, several PLA aircraft and vessels worked jointly to create a “shore-sea-air joint strike system.” The PLA also released an animation that depicts several land-based assets, aircraft, and vessels launching joint precision strikes at key targets on Taiwan.  
• According to reports, about 20 vessels—half from China and half from Taiwan—were engaged in a stand-off near the median line that divides the Taiwan Strait. However, details about the situation remain scant.  
• Taiwan MND reported that a total of 70 PLA aircraft and 11 vessels had been detected around Taiwan that day. Of these aircraft, 35 crossed the southern, central, and northern areas of the Taiwan Strait median line and entered the southwest and southeast ADIZ. Notably, four J-15 fighters took off from the Shandong aircraft carrier and entered Taiwan’s southeastern ADIZ, marking the first time J-15s have entered the ADIZ.  
• The Japanese MoD reported that the Shandong had moved north, coming within 142 miles (230 km) of Miyako Island.  

Monday, April 10 

• On the final day of the “Joint Sword” exercises, CCTV reporting noted that drills focused on “joint shock and deterrence and island closure and control” (联合震慑，孤岛封控). This emphasized maneuvers to cut of access to the island from seas east of Taiwan. Several destroyers and frigates carried out suppressive combat patrol missions and joint blockade simulations, and the Shandong aircraft carrier group participated in the final day of drills from the waters east of Taiwan. The carrier group consisted of one Type 055 destroyer, one Type 052D destroyer, two Type 054A frigates, one Type 901 replenishment ship, and there was likely a nuclear-powered attack submarine as well.
• Taiwan’s MND reported a record-high number of PLA aircraft around Taiwan. A total of 91 aircraft and 12 vessels had been detected. Of those aircraft, 54 crossed the Taiwan Strait median line or entered Taiwan’s southwest and southeast ADIZ. For the second day in a row, J-15 fighters entered the southeast ADIZ after presumably launching from the Shandong carrier.
• Japan’s MoD announced that between April 7-9, the Shandong carrier launched a total of roughly 120 sorties, including about 80 aircraft and 40 helicopter sorties. Japan's MoD also announced that since March 28, the PLA Type 815A electronic reconnaissance vessel Kaiyangxing had been circling Japan.
• Shortly after 6 pm, the ETC announced the successful conclusion of the “joint cruise and patrol special operation” in the Taiwan Strait. 

Tuesday, April 11

• The day after the conclusion of the “Joint Sword” exercises, Taiwan’s MND reported it had detected 26 aircraft and nine vessels carrying out combat readiness patrols. In total, 35 aircraft and 8 vessels detected in the region, and 15 of these aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ or crossed the Taiwan Strait median line.
• Reuters stated that there were small-scale military exercises occurring off the coast of Fuzhou, which were likely part of the previously announced exercises by Fujian MSA.
• Japan’s MoD reported that the Shandong aircraft carrier was about 180 miles (290 km) from Japan’s Miyako Island.

Wednesday, April 12

• Taiwan’s Ministry of Transportation and Communication reported that on April 11, China had issued a no-fly zone due to “aerospace activities” that China would be conducting in a busy region of airspace north of Taiwan from April 16 to 18, from 9 am to 2 pm each day. China then reduced the timeframe to just 27 minutes, from 9:30 am to 9:57 am on April 16. This zone overlaps within Taiwan’s ADIZ and is just 85 nautical miles from Taiwan’s northern coast. Taiwan’s Central News Agency reported that China’s modified "no fly zone" will impact 33 flights in total.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 26 PLA aircraft and 7 PLAN vessels around Taiwan. A total of 14 aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait median line.
• China’s Shandong carrier group was still operating in the West Pacific, 137 miles (220 km) south of Japan’s Miyako Island.

Thursday, April 13

• China announced a new warning related to a zone north of Taiwan. The Fujian MSA announced that vessels should not enter the zone due to the possibility of falling rocket debris from 9:00 am to 3:00 pm on Sunday, April 16.
• The Hainan MSA announced four-day military exercises from April 16–19 in the South China Sea northeast of Hainan Island.  
• The Shandong carrier group moved southeast, further into the West Pacific. Japan’s MoD tracked the group almost 286 miles (460 km) south-southeast of Miyako Island.
• The Liaoning MSA announced a day of military drills on April 14 in the Bohai Sea.
• Taiwan’s MND reported that it detected 4 PLA aircraft and 8 naval vessels around Taiwan. One aircraft entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ.

Friday, April 14

• Taiwan’s MND reported 6 PLA aircraft and 4 navy vessels around the island. Two PLA aircraft crossed the median line or entered Taiwan’s SW ADIZ.
• Regarding the airspace and maritime closure zone announced for April 16, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated that reports describing it as a “no-fly zone” was “not accurate.”
• China’s Shandong carrier continued moving east away from Taiwan and reportedly was 323 miles (520 km) south-west of the Japanese-administers Okinotorishima reef.
• The Liaoning MSA announced three separate drills in the Bohai Sea and Bohai Strait. Two of the exercises were scheduled to last only one day on April 15 and April 16, while the third was scheduled from April 16–23.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 8 PLA aircraft and 5 PLA naval vessels around the island. Three PLA aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait median line or entered Taiwan’s ADIZ. 

Saturday, April 15

• Japan’s MoD reported that the Shandong carrier group was 230 miles (370 km) Southeast of Okinotorishima reef in the West Pacific.
• Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense observed 15 PLA aircraft and 4 PLAN vessels around Taiwan. Four of the PLA aircraft entered the southeast and southwest portions of Taiwan’s ADIZ.

Sunday, April 16

• China reported it had successfully launched a Long March-4B rocket that was carrying a meteorological satellite (Fengyun-3 07, also referred to as Fengyun-3G) from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in Gansu Province. Debris from the launch was later detected in the previously announced no-fly zone. The zone was reportedly free of aircraft between 9:30 am and 10:20 am.
• The Shandong carrier was tracked by the Japanese MoD 441 miles (710 km) south-southeast of Okinotorishima reef. Additionally, Japan’s MoD reported that aircraft based on the Shandong conducted 210 sorties from April 10-16, and from April 7–16, there was a total of 330 sorties. Japan scrambled fighter jets in response to this activity.
• The USS Milius Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer sailed through the Taiwan Strait, just a week after it sailed past Chinese artificial islands in the South China Sea. China’s Ministry of Foreign affairs accused the United States of disrupting peace in the Strait. The PLA Eastern Theater Command issued a statement and ensured that they will “resolutely defend national sovereignty and regional peace.”
• Taiwan’s MND reported 18 PLA aircraft and 4 PLA navy vessels around Taiwan. Four PLA aircraft entered Taiwan’s southwest and southeast ADIZ.

Monday, April 17

• The Qingdao MSA announced 3 hours of “major” military activities on April 18 in an area of the Yellow Sea. The coordinates for the exercise indicate an area along the coast of the port city of Qingdao, but further details of the exercises were not released.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 12 PLA aircraft and 4 PLA naval vessels around Taiwan. Four of the aircraft entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ.

Tuesday, April 18

• Taiwan announced it plans to purchase up to 400 U.S.-made land-launched Harpoon missiles as part of deal approved in 2020 by the United States Congress.
• Reportedly, China conducted a three-hour military drill in the Yellow Sea, as announced by the Qingdao MSA the day before.
• The Guangdong MSA announced a day of military exercises on April 20 near the Pearl River Delta.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 2 PLA aircraft and 3 PLA naval vessels operating near the island. One of the aircraft entered Taiwan’s Southeast ADIZ.

Wednesday, April 19

• The Shanghai MSA announced that live-fire drills would take place on April 20 for six hours near the mouth of the Yangtze estuary.
• The Liaoning MSA announced two days of military drills in the northern Bohai Sea from April 25–27.
• The Hainan MSA announced  military drills in the South China Sea from April 21–23.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 7 PLA navy vessels around Taiwan.

Thursday, April 20

• The Liaoning MSA announced new military drills in the Bohai Sea from April 21–22.
• The Shandong MSA announced military drills in the Yellow Sea near Qingdao from April 21–24. This exercise is occurring in the same location as the 3 hour long “major” military activities that took place on April 18.
• The Guangdong MSA announced three days of live-fire training from April 23–25 in the South China Sea.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 19 PLA aircraft and 5 PLA naval vessels around Taiwan. 10 aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait median line or entered the island’s ADIZ.

Friday, April 21

• The Liaoning MSA announced military exercises in the Bohai Sea from April 23–30.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 12 PLA aircraft and 4 PLA naval vessels around Taiwan.

Saturday, April 22

• Taiwan’s MND reported 4 PLA aircraft and 3 PLA naval vessels around Taiwan. Of these aircraft, 3 entered Taiwan’s southwest and southeast ADIZ.

Sunday, April 23

• Taiwan’s MND reported 13 PLA aircraft and 3 PLA naval vessels near Taiwan. One of the aircraft entered Taiwan’s southeast ADIZ.

Monday, April 24

• The Liaoning MSA announced seven hours of military drills in the Bohai Strait scheduled to take place on April 25.
• Taiwan’s premier Chen Chien-jen revealed that the United States and Taiwan are discussing the potential for building a U.S. weapons stockpile near the region, which would grant Taiwan weapons access in the event of a cross-Strait contingency.
• Taiwan’s MND announced that the PLA Shandong aircraft carrier was detected only 120 nautical miles southeast of Taiwan’s southern tip, and the vessel was expected to sail through waters southeast of Taiwan later that day. Japan’s MoD reported that the Shandong aircraft carrier group was travelling west back towards the South China Sea
• Taiwan’s MND also reported 9 PLA aircraft and 11 PLA navy vessels around Taiwan, with one aircraft entering Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ.

Tuesday, April 25

• The Liaoning MSA announced 10 hours of military drills in the northern Bohai Sea on April 26.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 6 PLA aircraft and 4 PLA naval vessels around Taiwan. One aircraft entered the southeast ADIZ region.

Wednesday, April 26

• The Hainan MSA announced four hours of military drills to take place on April 27.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 12 PLA aircraft and 4 PLA naval vessels around Taiwan. Five aircraft either crossed the Taiwan Strait median line of entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ.

Thursday, April 27

• The Liaoning MSA announced that military exercises will take place in the Yellow Sea between April 30 and May 7.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 38 PLA aircraft and 6 PLA naval vessels around Taiwan, marking a high point in Chinese activity since the end of major exercises in early April. 19 of the detected aircraft either crossed the median line or entered Taiwan’s ADIZ. Notably, a Chinese TB-001 Scorpion UAV encircled Taiwan on its southern, eastern, and northern sides.

Friday, April 28

• Taiwan’s MND reported that 17 PLA aircraft and 8 PLA naval vessels were around Taiwan. 13 of the detected aircraft either crossed the Taiwan Strait median line or entered Taiwan’s ADIZ.

Saturday, April 29

• Taiwan’s MND detected 10 PLA aircraft and 6 PLA naval vessels around Taiwan. One of the detected aircraft entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ.
• The Japanese MoD reported three Chinese ships sailing between Okinawa and Miyako Island towards the west Pacific. The three ships were a guided missile destroyer, a frigate, and a supply ship. Japan’s MoD also detected a Chinese intelligence ship sailing north through the Tsushima Strait.

Sunday, April 30

• Taiwan’s MND reported 7 PLA aircraft and 3 PLA naval vessels around Taiwan. Two aircraft entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ.
• The Japanese MoD tracked five Chinese ships as they sailed north through the Tsushima Strait, including three guided missile destroyers, one frigate and a replenishment ship.

Timeline of Key Chinese Diplomatic and Non-Military Activities

Similar to its military activities, China’s direct diplomatic and non-military responses escalated after the Tsai-McCarthy meeting. From April 6 onwards, China embraced sanctions on select U.S. and Taiwan entities. Beijing, however, appears to be balancing its desire to punish Tsai and the current government in Taipei with a broader imperative to increase various forms of economic and political exchanges between China and Taiwan.  

Tuesday, April 4 

• One day prior to the Tsai-McCarthy meeting, the congressional liaison at the Chinese embassy in Washington Li Xiang sent an email to members of Congress who would be in attendance at the meeting, urging them to not meet with Tsai. Li warned that China opposes “any form of official interaction between the US and Taiwan” and that China “will most likely take necessary and resolute actions in response.”  

Thursday, April 6 

• In a highly orchestrated public move, four major Chinese government actors and departments each issued public statements denouncing Tsai’s transit and meeting with Speaker McCarthy.  
• China’s top legislative body, the National People’s Congress, asserted, “The action of McCarthy, the third highest-ranking official of the U.S. government, has seriously broken the commitment made by the United States to China on the Taiwan question” and it reiterated that “the Taiwan issue” is “the first red line that must not be crossed in China-U.S. relations.”   
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a statement that warned that “‘Taiwan independence’ and cross-Strait peace and stability are as irreconcilable as fire and water,” promising that “the pursuit of ‘Taiwan independence’ will lead nowhere.”  
• The State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office condemned the “DPP authorities” who “promote Taiwan-US collusion.” It noted that Tsai and the DPP are pushing Taiwan toward a dangerous brink of potential conflict. The office warned that it “will take firm measures to punish the ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces and their actions” and “any act of seeking ‘independence’ will be smashed to pieces under the powerful force of the Chinese sons and daughters to oppose ‘independence’ and promote reunification.” 
• China’s MND issued a statement saying that the PLA “sticks to its duties and missions” and “resolutely defends national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” 

Friday, April 7 

• The Taiwan Work Office issued sanctions on certain institutions and individuals in both Taiwan and the United States. Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan’s representative to the United States, was sanctioned for a second time. The sanctions bar her from entering mainland China, Hong Kong, or Macao due to her “diehard” support for “Taiwan independence.” China also sanctioned the leaders of Taiwan’s Prospect Foundation (a think tank focusing on cross-Strait relations) and the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats (a regional organization of liberal democratic political parties in Asia). In the United States, China sanctioned the Hudson Institute and the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, and specific administrators at each organization, freezing any assets they had in China and barring them from entering the country.  
• In a MFA press conference, spokesperson Mao Ning emphasized that “the Taiwan question is not about democracy, but about China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” claiming “the sovereignty and territory of China have never been divided and shall never be divided.” She asserted that “the future of Taiwan lies in China’s reunification, and the wellbeing of the people in Taiwan hinges on the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” 

Monday, April 10 

• Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said “the combat readiness security patrol encircling the Taiwan Island and the ‘Joint Sword’ exercises is a stern warning to the provocative activities of ‘Taiwan independence’”secessionist forces and their collusion with external forces,” highlighting the exercises as “a necessary move to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” 
• Wang Huning, a Politburo Standing Committee member and chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, met with a delegation of Taiwan business executives led by Liu Chao-shiuan, co-president of the Cross-Strait CEO Summit in Beijing. Wang messaged the desire for improved economic and trade exchanges and that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait “cannot be realized with the existence of ‘Taiwan independence.’”

Wednesday, April 12

• China’s Ministry of Commerce announced it was launching an investigation into Taiwan’s trade restrictions on over 2,400 mainland goods at the request of several trade groups. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council warned that the investigation will not improve cross-strait trade but make future cooperation more difficult.

Wednesday, April 19

• Amid speculation that China’s investigation into trade barriers between Taiwan and the mainland would result in the termination of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECTA) that was signed in 2010, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council urged Beijing to keep the ECTA in place.
• China’s Taiwan Affairs Office added Lockheed Martin and Raytheon to its list of “Unreliable Entities” after arms manufactured by both companies were sold to Taiwan. Senior executives from both companies are now barred from China.

Wednesday, April 26

• China confirmed that it had arrested Li Yanhe (penname Fucha), a Taiwan-based publisher on the grounds that his activities were "endangering national security." News of his arrest came a day after Chinese authorities announced the formal arrest of a leading Taiwanese nationalist politician for “secession” whom they detained in August 2022.

Authors:
Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Samantha Lu, Hannah Price, Matthew Slade

The post Tracking China’s April 2023 Military Exercises around Taiwan appeared first on ChinaPower Project.

November 17, 2022 Debates and Keynote Remarks

9:00 am – 9:05 am: Welcome Remarks

Dr. Bonny Lin
Director, China Power Project and senior fellow, Asian Security, CSIS

9:05 am – 9:35 am: Keynote Remarks

Senator Edward J. Markey (D-MA)
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy

9:35 am – 10:50 am: Debate

Proposition: China’s “new normal” of increased military activities in the Taiwan Strait is likely to lead to a US-China or China-Taiwan crisis/conflict in the next year or two

FOR: Mr. John K. Culver
Nonresident senior fellow, Global China Hub, Atlantic Council;
Former senior intelligence officer, Central Intelligence Agency

AGAINST: Dr. Alexander Huang
Chairman and CEO, Council on Strategic & Wargaming Studies;
Special advisor to the chairman and director of International Affairs, Kuomintang (KMT)

10:50 am – 11:00 am: Break

11:00 am – 12:15 pm: Discussion

Proposition: Beijing views a strong China-Russia relationship as a net strategic asset 

Dr. Dave Shullman
Senior director, Global China Hub, Atlantic Council
 
Ms. Yun Sun
Senior fellow and co-director, East Asia Program and director, China Program, the Stimson Center

12:15 pm – 12:20 pm: Closing Remarks

Dr. Bonny Lin

January 24, 2023 Debate

Proposition: China can work with the United States to provide cooperative global economic leadership to help the world economy function effectively.

FOR: Dr. Fred Bergsten
Nonresident Senior Fellow and Director Emeritus
Peterson Institute for International Economics

AGAINST: Mr. Daniel Rosen
Partner, Rhodium Group
Senior Associate (Non-resident), Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS

The post China’s Power: Up for Debate appeared first on ChinaPower Project.

From October 16–22, 2022, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) convened its 20th National Congress to reshuffle the country’s leadership roster and set the political and policy direction going forward. Party congresses, which only take place once every five years, are closely scrutinized for clues into China’s opaque political system. As part of broader personnel shifts, the top brass of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was significantly altered, offering insights into the trends underway within China’s military.

This ChinaPower feature was originally published before the 20th Party Congress with analysis of past personnel changes within the PLA leadership to identify important trends and to forecast changes that could take place at the 20th Party Congress. Following the conclusion of the 20th Party Congress, a new section was added to lay out and analyze key PLA-related outcomes from the party gathering.

Use the links below to skip to sections of the feature:

• Pre-Party Congress Analysis: Trends and Forecasts
• Post-Party Congress Analysis: Outcomes and Key Takeaways

Pre-Party Congress Analysis: Trends and Forecasts

The analysis in this section reflects trends leading up to the 20th Party Congress and has not been changed after the Party Congress. See the following section for analysis of the new Central Military Commission and the outcomes of the Party Congress.

The Central Military Commission

Among the crucial decisions to be made at the party congress are appointments to the Central Military Commission (CMC). The CMC sits at the helm of the PLA and controls China’s domestic security forces, the People’s Armed Police. It is responsible for overseeing Beijing’s use of military or security forces to advance its national security and foreign policy objectives. Several members of the CMC also sit on leading party organizations such as the National Security Commission and the Foreign Affairs Commission that determine and set China’s national security and external policies.

The CMC is first and foremost a party organization, meaning China’s military reports to the CCP, not the Chinese state. The CCP prioritizes absolute control over the PLA—a reflection of the famous quote by Mao Zedong that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Control over the PLA is so important that former top party leaders Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin chose to retain their Chairmanship of the CMC even after relinquishing other top state and party titles.

In commanding the PLA, the CMC directs a vast bureaucracy. It oversees the headquarters of the main services—the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force—as well as the Strategic Support Force and Joint Logistic Support Force, which were set up as part of Xi Jinping’s 2016 military reforms. The CMC also directs five theater commands (previously seven military regions), which are in charge of operations within their designated areas. Finally, the CMC oversees a suite of subsidiary departments, offices, and other organizations, such as the Joint Staff Department and the Political Work Department.

Click to enlarge.

Xi Jinping became CCP General Secretary and Chairman of the CMC in late 2012, even before he became China’s president in 2013. He is all but guaranteed to remain Chairman after the 20th Party Congress. Below Xi on the CMC are two Vice Chairmen, both of whom sit on the powerful CCP Politburo. The senior Vice Chairman, General Xu Qiliang, rose through the ranks of the PLA Air Force to become its commander before joining the CMC in 2007 and being promoted to Vice Chairman in 2012. General Zhang Youxia hails from the PLA Army and served as Commander of the Shenyang Military Region before being promoted to the CMC in 2012 and becoming its Vice Chairman in 2017.

Rounding out the current CMC are four regular members: General Wei Fenghe, General Li Zuocheng, Admiral Miao Hua, and General Zhang Shengmin. Each of these four members have seats on the CCP Central Committee and concurrently hold important positions within the PLA. General Wei is a State Councilor and Minister of Defense, and General Li is Chief of the CMC Joint Staff Department, which oversees operational planning and command. Admiral Miao is head of the CMC Political Work Department, which directs all party and cultural work within the PLA, and General Zhang is head of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, which oversees anti-corruption investigations.

China’s Central Military Commission before the 20th Party Congress

Scroll to view all members. Use the toggle buttons below to filter by position.

Past Trends in CMC Personnel Changes

This analysis is derived from a biographical database of CMC members compiled by the ChinaPower team. The database is available here.

The CCP leadership has wide discretion over the membership of the CMC. Neither the party nor the state constitutions outline the selection process for the CMC. Events of recent years indicate that Xi has attained substantial influence over the PLA, including the makeup of the CMC. Toward the end of his first term, in late 2015 and early 2016, Xi initiated sweeping reforms of the PLA’s structure which had direct impacts on the CMC and the bureaucracy it oversees. Xi’s influence over the CMC has likely grown with time. Having consolidated considerable political influence during his first term, he was better poised to impose his preferences on CMC appointments during his second term and thereafter.

One of the most notable features of the CMC in recent years is the absence of a civilian senior Vice Chairman position, which was typically filled by China’s leader-in-waiting in the years just before his promotion into the top leadership role. Xi Jinping was CMC Vice Chairman from 2010 to 2012 immediately prior to becoming China’s paramount leader. Hu Jintao was likewise CMC Vice Chairman from 1999 to 2004 before (and after) becoming party and state leader.¹

Under Xi’s leadership, however, no civilian has been named a CMC Vice Chairman. This could suggest the CCP has not tapped a successor to Xi—or, if they have, the party does not want that successor to be known. It also means that Xi Jinping has less diluted influence over the PLA since, unlike his predecessors, he does not have to contend with a successor on the CMC. It is possible a successor to Xi could be appointed as a CMC Vice Chairman during Xi’s third term (2022–2027), but if precedent holds this would happen near the end of his third term, not during the 20th Party Congress that kicks off Xi’s next five years.

The CMC is not just missing a civilian Vice Chairman; the number of military members has also shrunk. In the preceding two decades, the CMC typically included 9 or 10 military members. These members typically spanned a wide range of positions, including heads of several CMC subsidiary organizations and service commanders. By comparison, the current CMC has only 6 military members, with four of these holding a concurrent position as head of a CMC subsidiary organ. As a result, fewer CMC organizations are represented compared to before, and there are no service commanders on the CMC.

The CMC of Xi’s second term also no longer disproportionately comprises members from the Army. Whereas the CMC of the 15^th CCP Central Committee (1997–2002) was entirely made up of members from the Army, the current CMC includes members from each of the four main services, with only two of the six military members coming from the Army. This tracks with a broader effort by Xi Jinping to shift the PLA away from a military dominated by ground forces toward a more joint force with significant air and naval capabilities. As part of this process, Xi announced in 2015 that the PLA would shed some 300,000 personnel, primarily from the Army.

Some of the current CMC members have even served in multiple services, which at face value suggests a more joint-qualified leadership. Admiral Miao Hua spent much of his career in the Army before transitioning to the Navy in 2014. Similarly, General Zhang Shengmin was previously in the Army before transitioning to the Rocket Force. However, both are political track officers who respectively rose through the political commissar system and through the PLA discipline inspection system. Their move from the Army to other services is therefore not an indicator of significant joint experience in terms of operational command. Indeed, the CMC lacks any members with operational experience in the Navy—a situation that could change after the 20th Party Congress.

Furthermore, trends below the CMC level show that the Army is still represented in far greater numbers than other services. The PLA also still lacks high-ranking officers with significant joint experience of the kind that is typical in more joint forces like the U.S. military.

While the current CMC’s membership does not suggest a sprint toward greater jointness across the services, it does show that most of its members have somewhat more diverse experiences than in the past. CMC members are promoted to the CMC only after having served in a theater commander grade (正战区职) position—the highest grade below the grade of CMC member.² This typically includes being a commander or political commissar of a PLA organization that fits into one of three categories: the services, the theater commands (previously military regions), or a subsidiary organization of the CMC.

In the past, CMC members would typically be promoted to the CMC after having experience in just one of these three categories at the theater commander grade. Under Xi, however, the promotion tracks have become more varied. Among the current CMC, four of the six members served in two areas immediately prior to joining the CMC. For example, General Li Zuocheng served as commander of the Chengdu Military Region and then commander of the PLA Army before being promoted to the CMC. Similarly, Admiral Miao Hua was political commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region and then political commissar of the Navy before joining the CMC.

This change is not necessarily transformative but may suggest that the Chinese leadership is pushing for top PLA officers to have more significant experience serving at high levels across the military bureaucracy. It also has the added benefit of potentially helping to deter corruption, since moving around reduces the ability of officers to establish a “fiefdom” in which they can dominate.

It is worth noting that, among those CMC members of the last 25 years who previously led theater commands—either as commander or political commissar—some theater commands are more represented than others. Nine CMC members came from the Northern Theater Command (including its Shenyang and Jinan Military Region predecessors).³ This is partly because the two regions were merged to create the new theater commands; however, its constituent military regions were themselves the most frequently represented. This is not all that surprising since the Northern Theater Command is responsible for responding to crises and conflicts on the Korean Peninsula, a major potential geopolitical flashpoint.

What is somewhat surprising is that the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands are not more highly represented. The Eastern Theater Command is responsible for Taiwan and the East China Sea—critical and sensitive areas—yet only three of its leaders have made it to the CMC over the past 25 years. Given growing tensions around Taiwan, it is possible that more leaders of the Eastern Theater Command could make their way onto the CMC in the coming years. Similarly, the Southern Theater Command has only sent two leaders to the CMC despite the South China Sea’s importance for Beijing. It too could see greater representation on the CMC going forward.

Click to enlarge.

Three things have largely remained unchanged for CMC members. First, thanks to laws governing PLA promotion and retirement, there has not been a notable shift in the age of CMC members in recent decades. Over the past 25 years, CMC members have joined the commission at an average age of about 60, with the youngest joining at the age of 56 and the oldest joining at 65. CMC Vice Chairmen tend to join at slightly younger ages, which reflects the fact that they typically have longer tenures on the CMC, serving as members before becoming Vice Chairmen.  

Second, most CMC members continue to rise to the CMC having served in operational roles rather than political positions. Proportionally, the current CMC contains more political track officers than in the past, but this is due to the shrinking of the CMC rather than an outright increase in the number of political-track members.

Third, the CMC continues to include members who have fought in wars. The PLA has not fought in a large-scale conflict since the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 (and the ensuing border conflicts). As time has gone on, this has meant that fewer and fewer PLA officers have experience in conflict. It is notable, then, that the CMC has bucked this trend. Two of the current CMC members—Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and General Li Zuocheng—have wartime experience, which is generally consistent with past CMC iterations. As these older members phase out, fewer CMC members will have experience in a war.  

Previewing Changes to the CMC at the 20th Party Congress

Armed with these insights, it is possible to forecast some of the potential outcomes of the 20th Party Congress.

First, if the CCP leadership upholds norms around retirement for CMC members, four of the six military members are set to retire. Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang and Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia were both born in 1950, putting them well beyond the usual age for staying in office. Defense Minister Wei Fenghe and Chief of the Joint Staff Department Li Zuocheng are both 68, just past the typical retirement age.

If all four retire, precedent would suggest that the other two members, Admiral Miao Hua and General Zhang Shengmin, are well-positioned to become the next Vice Chairmen. Over the past 25 years, all CMC Vice Chairmen (except for one) previously served as a regular CMC member prior to being promoted to Vice Chairman. However, it is perhaps more likely that just one of the two is promoted to Vice Chairman since both hail from political (rather than operational) career tracks. It is possible that one of the other current members—particularly General Wei and General Li since they are just at the cutoff age for retirement—could break retirement age norms to become Vice Chairman. Alternately, a non-CMC member could be catapulted into the position. While the latter outcome would be untraditional, Xi has demonstrated a unique tendency to fast-track many top officers for promotion.

Regardless, it is highly likely that several new members join the CMC after the 20th Party Congress, and they will likely be current members of the 19th Central Committee who have reached the grade of theater command leader. Of the 29 CMC Vice Chairmen and members over the last 25 years, virtually all of them (except one) were on the Central Committee prior to promotion to the CMC. There are currently 16 un-retired members of the PLA on the 19th Central Committee at the theater command leader grade from which the future CMC could draw.⁴

One person who stands out as having a good chance of promotion to the CMC is General Liu Zhenli, who has been Commander of the Army since 2021. He is one of the few members of the Central Committee with experience in combat (in the China-Vietnam border conflicts of the 1980s), and he is only 58 years old, which means he could serve at least two terms on the CMC without breaking retirement age norms.

If the leadership disregards Central Committee membership as a prerequisite for promotion to the CMC, General Lin Xiangyang stands out as a potential candidate. He is the current Commander of the Eastern Theater Command, which played a starring role in the unprecedented August 2022 military exercises around Taiwan. Like General Liu, he is approximately 58 and could therefore have a longer tenure on the CMC.

Broadly speaking, Xi will likely want to ensure that the makeup of the CMC is at least as diverse as the current one. This could include appointing at least one Vice Chairman who is not from the Army and including at least one member each from the Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force. There will also likely be a premium on appointing officers with combat experience or extensive operational experience to ensure that the PLA is as battle-ready as possible.

Post-Party Congress Analysis: Outcomes and Key Takeaways

The 20th Party Congress concluded on October 22, and the following day the CCP announced the makeup of the Politburo and its standing committee, as well as the CMC and other key bodies. The personnel changes to the CMC show a willingness to break norms to put key individuals in place and they suggest that the party gave preference to officers with specific experiences. However, the changes also represented a reversal of previous moves toward a more diverse CMC.

In some respects, the new CMC represents significant continuity with the previous CMC. As expected, Xi Jinping remained as CMC Chairman, and no heir-apparent was named a CMC Vice Chairman. The commission also remained the same size, with one Chairman, two Vice Chairmen, and four regular members. Three members from the previous CMC remain. Zhang Youxia broke age norms to be reappointed a Vice Chairman, and at age 72 he is now the oldest official in the entire CCP Politburo. Additionally, Miao Hua and Zhang Shengmin remained on the CMC and likely retained their positions as head of the CMC Political Work Department and Discipline Inspection Commission, respectively.

However, three new officers bring significant changes to the CMC. First, He Weidong, the former Commander of the Eastern Theater Command, replaced Xu Qiliang to become the second Vice Chairman. The Chinese leadership broke two notable norms in catapulting him to the position of Vice Chairman. Almost all CMC members of the past few decades had a seat on the CCP Central Committee prior to their promotion to the CMC, and almost all CMC Vice Chairmen had experience as a CMC member before promotion to Vice Chair. He Weidong had neither.

He Weidong was likely elevated to Vice Chairman in part because of his specific background. From late 2019 to early 2022, He was the Commander of the Eastern Theater Command, making him responsible for much of the PLA’s activities related to Taiwan. Prior to that He was Deputy Commander of the Western Theater Command and Commander of the Western Theater Command Army. In that position, He was reportedly involved in China’s response to the China-India border skirmishes that took place on the Doklam Plateau, though available reports are not authoritative and the extent of his involvement is unknown. He also has links to Xi Jinping, having served in a Fujian-based army unit when Xi was Party Secretary of Fujian. Experience in these two important mission sets, coupled with ties to Xi Jinping, made He an appealing pick for Vice Chairman.

Want to learn more about the foreign policy and military dimensions of the 20th Party Congress? Read analysis of Xi Jinping’s report to the 20th Party Congress by members of the ChinaPower team.

LEARN MORE

The other two new members have distinctive backgrounds as well. Li Shangfu, the former head of the CMC Equipment Development Department, joined the commission and is expected to become the next Minister of National Defense, replacing Wei Fenghe. As head of the Equipment Development Department, Li was sanctioned by the U.S. government in 2018 due to Chinese purchases of advanced Su-35 fighters and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems. This promises to significantly complicate future U.S.-China ministerial-level interactions on military and security issues.

Rounding out the new CMC is Liu Zhenli, former Commander of the Army. As our pre-Party Congress analysis forecasted, Liu was promoted to the CMC, likely to replace Li Zuocheng as Chief of the Joint Staff Department. Liu is distinguished in being the only CMC member besides Zhang Youxia to have experience in real combat, having fought in border conflicts with Vietnam in the 1980s. His combat experience is a likely reason he is slated to serve in the important position of Chief of the Joint Staff Department. However, he has never served in a joint position.   

Taken together, the CMC’s new lineup offers several key takeaways. First, it shows a surprising pivot back toward a more Army-dominated CMC. In the previous CMC, all four of the main service branches were represented. Now, four of the six military members are from the Army, with no representation from the Air Force.⁵ On top of this, Miao Hua and Zhang Shengmin—the two CMC members who are not from the Army—rose through the ranks as political commissars. They do not have experience in operational command positions.

Second, the CMC appointments suggest an emphasis on operational experience. Zhang Youxia was likely retained despite age norms due to his valuable experience in Vietnam border conflicts as well as experience in the Central and North Theater Command regions. He Weidong has deep experience with Taiwan and also spent time in the Western Theater Command. Amid rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait as well as a general worsening security environment, the leadership in Beijing likely assessed a crucial need to have two Vice Chairmen with experience across the major theaters of conflict, including a Vice Chairman with extensive experience on Taiwan. However, the dominance of the Army on the CMC is noticeable given that a Taiwan contingency would depend most heavily on PLA air and naval forces—not ground forces.

Third, the new CMC reflects deep experience in the areas of military equipment and defense science and technology. Both Zhang Youxia and Li Shangfu were directors of the Equipment Development Department—positions which gave them direct influence over PLA modernization efforts.⁶

Finally, political ties to Xi Jinping likely played a crucial role in CMC appointments, particularly the two top positions. Zhang Youxia is known to have close personal ties to Xi. He Weidong’s norm-breaking and rapid elevation to one of the highest Chinese military positions will likely make him more dependent on Xi and willing to carry out Xi’s orders. Beyond the two Vice Chairmen, Xi is also known to trust Miao Hua when it comes to handling party affairs within the PLA. In the wake of the 20th Party Congress, the CCP’s new Politburo and its standing committee were heavily dominated by Xi loyalists. It is no surprise that he would seek to shape the CMC in his image as well.

Authors:
Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Matthew P. Funaiole, Samantha Lu, Hannah Price, Nicholas Kaufman, Hanyue (Amy) Ouyang

The post How Did the 20th Party Congress Impact China’s Military? appeared first on ChinaPower Project.

As China’s recent unprecedented military exercises around Taiwan demonstrated, the Taiwan Strait is a major flashpoint that threatens to undermine regional and global stability. Yet crucial questions remain about the dynamics shaping the Taiwan Strait. What is China’s approach to Taiwan and how long is Beijing willing to wait for Taiwan’s unification? Will China use significant military force against Taiwan, and when? How does Beijing view the potential of U.S. intervention in a Taiwan contingency?

To shed light on these questions, ChinaPower polled 64 leading experts on the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, and cross-Strait relations.¹ The experts polled include 28 former high-level U.S. government (USG) officials from both Democrat and Republican administrations, as well as 23 former USG policy and intelligence analysts and 13 top experts from academia and think tanks.² Responses were collected from August 10–September 8, 2022, amid the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis.

Key takeaways from the survey are shown below. Click a tile to jump to the corresponding section for additional insights and analysis. Click here to jump to the conclusion section. You can also download supporting documents using the links below.

Downloads:

• Click here to download a PDF of the full feature.
• Click here to download a two-page summary of the survey findings.
• Click here to download a PDF of the survey questionnaire.

China’s Strategy for Taiwan

At the most basic level, China’s overall approach to Taiwan hinges on two main questions: does China have a clear strategy to achieve unification and how patiently is it willing to wait? The experts polled by our survey broadly believe that Beijing does not have a strategy and that it is willing to wait to achieve unification—but not forever.

Asked whether Beijing has “a coherent internal strategy and roadmap, with concrete stages and actionable next steps,” 80 percent of respondents said “no.” There was no significant difference in responses to this question based on the identity of the respondents: former senior USG officials and other respondents broadly agree on the matter.

The general assessment that China lacks a coherent strategy is a reflection of public opinion polls in Taiwan, which consistently show that Taiwan’s citizens are not interested in unification with China. Under President Tsai Ing-wen, Taipei has also rejected China’s proposed “one country, two systems” offer and watched as Beijing cracked down on Hong Kong and reversed promises of autonomy for the Chinese special administrative region. China’s inability to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwan government and people has led Beijing to increasingly leverage coercive tools against the island, including threats to use significant military force. These dynamics raise serious questions as to whether China has a coherent strategy for peaceful unification with Taiwan.

Linked to China’s overall strategy are Beijing’s assessments of the necessary conditions for unification with the island. Only 10 percent of respondents think Beijing’s approach is to push for unification “at the earliest possible opportunity.” The overwhelming majority (84 percent) of respondents say “Beijing is willing to wait for unification but will not accept the status quo permanently.” For this group, there is likely an assessment that Beijing is willing to wait because the conditions—political, economic, or military—are not yet optimal for China to achieve peaceful or forceful unification. Only 6 percent believe Beijing is willing to permanently accept the status quo—wherein Taiwan is self-governed but Taipei has not declared independence—and none of the 64 respondents think that China would ever accept Taiwan independence.

China's Timeline for Unification

Some of the most hotly debated questions revolve around China’s timeline for unification. These questions are crucial, since a desire by Beijing to stick to a certain timeline could compel China to ramp up coercive measures or even military attacks to achieve its objectives.

When asked if Beijing has set a “hard internal deadline for resolving the Taiwan issue,” 44 percent of respondents said Beijing has set a hard deadline to achieve unification by 2049. This is not an arbitrary year. Authoritative Chinese sources, including the 2022 white paper on Taiwan, have closely linked Taiwan’s unification with the concept of “national rejuvenation”—a nebulous goal that Chinese leaders aim to achieve by 2049 to mark the centennial of the PRC’s founding.

Some experts believe that 2049 is only a soft benchmark for China and not a hard deadline. As a result, some selected 2072 as the hard deadline for China to achieve unification, believing that 50 years from 2022 is the longest time China could give itself. Others (42 percent) selected the option that Beijing is willing to wait indefinitely as long as it still sees unification as possible.

Since experts do not formulate their assessments in a vacuum, the poll sought to gauge whether China’s recent unprecedented military exercises around Taiwan reflect changes in Beijing’s timelines. A large majority (80 percent) believe that the recent exercises do not indicate that China is accelerating its timeline for using large-scale military force against Taiwan. Notably, however, 29 percent of former senior USG officials believe the exercises do indicate a timeline shift while only 14 percent of other respondents hold that view.

Xi Jinping’s Third Term

China’s approach toward Taiwan over the next five years will be heavily shaped by Chinese leader Xi Jinping. He is China’s most powerful leader in generations, and he has abolished the two term limit on his power. Xi is set to begin his third five-year term in October 2022.

Under Xi, China has significantly ramped up pressure on Taiwan. There has been U.S. and international media speculation that the year 2027—which will mark the end of Xi’s third term and also the centennial of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—is a likely time period by which Xi will decide to use force against Taiwan to achieve unification. Xi’s own statements have also been interpreted by some as an indication that he seeks to resolve the Taiwan issue under his watch. In 2013 and 2019, Xi commented that the Taiwan issue should not be passed down from generation to generation. Yet he has been careful to not explicitly and publicly specify a date by which China needs to unify with Taiwan or use force against the island.

The experts polled by our survey broadly rejected the idea that China must act against Taiwan by 2027. About 83 percent of respondents assess that China does not plan to use significant kinetic military force against Taiwan by 2027.

China’s lack of a plan to use significant military force against Taiwan does not mean that Beijing will sit idly by. Indeed, 79 percent of respondents assess that Xi will move beyond a more passive focus on deterring perceived Taiwan independence and instead prioritize making progress toward peaceful unification during his third term. This means that Beijing will need to be much more active—and likely more coercive—toward Taiwan to create the conditions for unification. This could involve more unilateral moves on Beijing’s end to impose its sovereignty and control over the island.

Only 9 percent of respondents believe that Xi feels China has exhausted all peaceful options and will feel compelled in his third term to unify Taiwan through coercive measures or military force. This corresponds closely to the 9 percent that believe Beijing will seek unification at the earliest possible opportunity (See above in the section on “China’s Strategy for Taiwan”).

The Risk of a Taiwan Contingency

As cross-Strait tensions have flared in recent years, so has the likelihood of a military conflict or accident. Three of the survey’s questions sought to gauge experts’ assessments about the risks of various military contingencies in the next ten years. Their responses indicate a belief that a full amphibious invasion of Taiwan is possible—but more unlikely than not—while a more limited Chinese use of force and a military accident are fairly likely.

Asked how likely it is that China will engage in an amphibious invasion of Taiwan in the next ten years, 63 percent of experts responded that it is possible. Another 27 percent feel an invasion is unlikely. Only 8 percent think an invasion is likely.

Based on responses to other questions in the survey, these results indicate that most experts do not believe China proactively seeks to invade Taiwan in the next ten years. Instead, Beijing could feel compelled to do so if China views Taiwan or the United States as crossing unacceptable redlines.

While experts were unsure about the likelihood of an amphibious invasion, they were much more willing to believe that in the next 10 years China would “deliberately escalate its use of force short of invasion,” for example by blockading Taiwan. A slight majority believe that such a scenario is either likely (30 percent) or very likely (22 percent). However, a plurality (44 percent) still view this as possible. Only 5 percent believe it is unlikely and no experts believe it is not at all likely.

Respondents were even more likely to think that an “unintended military accident or collision will take place in or near the Taiwan Strait.” While a plurality (39 percent) still believe an accident or collision is possible, 34 percent believe such a scenario is likely and 22 percent believe it is very likely. Only 5 percent believe it is unlikely and no experts believe it is not at all likely. Notably, there were not major differences in views between former senior officials and other respondents.

Potential Chinese Responses to U.S. and Taiwan Actions

Also important to China’s plans for Taiwan is how China might respond to potential U.S. and Taiwan actions. Beijing could feel that it must respond by using military force. Respondents largely agree that China would invade if Taiwan declared independence and that Beijing would respond strongly and negatively if Washington dropped its long-held approach of strategic ambiguity.

Over the years, Beijing has repeatedly made known its objection to Taiwan independence. The PLA’s unprecedented August 2022 exercises were targeted at deterring “separatist activities” on the island, and Beijing has taken other measures such as sanctioning Taiwan officials that it has labeled “independence diehards.”

Survey respondents appear to take Beijing’s concerns seriously. More than three-quarters of the experts polled said that China would invade Taiwan immediately (within six months) if Taipei declared independence. There was little variation in this belief among different groups of respondents. Compared to other respondents, former senior USG officials were only slightly more likely to say China would invade (79 percent versus 75 percent). Even among the 23 percent that do not believe China would invade Taiwan immediately, some still believe that China could use significant force against Taiwan. This could involve launching a blockade or engaging in unprecedented, large military exercises targeting Taiwan.

Respondents were somewhat more sanguine about how Beijing would respond to a decision by Washington to end its long-held policy of strategic ambiguity—a policy wherein the United States does not say whether or not it would come to Taiwan’s defense. None of the polled experts believe China would respond to an end of strategic ambiguity by immediately invading Taiwan. Instead, 64 percent of polled experts expect that China would “respond negatively and significantly, provoking a U.S.-China or China-Taiwan crisis.” An additional 31 percent say that China would instead “respond negatively in a more limited way,” mainly lodging diplomatic protests.

Only two respondents believe that an official U.S. policy shift to defend Taiwan would deter China from using force against Taiwan, and only one respondent assesses that China would not respond to the U.S. policy change.  As shown in the next section, most experts do not believe ending U.S. strategic ambiguity would deter China from using force against Taiwan because Beijing already assumes that the U.S. military would come to Taiwan’s defense. Instead, Beijing is likely to view a change in U.S. policy as further provocation and as an effort to support Taiwan independence.

Chinese Thinking on U.S. Resolve

Experts polled in this survey think Beijing already assumes the United States will intervene militarily to defend Taiwan. Many also believe that Chinese leaders fear the U.S. still has a military advantage. 

Survey participants were asked to assess how far Beijing expects the United States would be willing to go to defend Taiwan in the event of an unprovoked Chinese invasion of Taiwan. They were given multiple options ranging from providing no support for Taiwan to bearing any military costs to defend the island. None of the experts assess that China believes Washington will provide no support or simply stop at political and economic aid. All respondents think China believes the United States would be willing to also deploy troops in Taiwan’s defense.

Experts diverge, however, on how far the United States would be willing to go to defend Taiwan. About 30 percent believe China assesses the United States is willing to deploy troops to defend Taiwan but is not willing to bear significant costs. Most respondents (66 percent) think Beijing has assessed that the United States is willing to go further by bearing substantial costs but will seek to contain the military conflict to the Indo-Pacific region. The remaining 5 percent think China sees the U.S. as willing to risk any cost, including a global war and attacks on the continental United States.

Importantly, these responses were specifically about a scenario in which the PLA launches an “unprovoked” invasion. If Taiwan were to provoke a Chinese attack by unilaterally declaring independence or by escalating through a preemptive military strike, Washington may be far less willing to come to Taiwan’s aid. Beijing is aware of this, and a different scenario would therefore likely be interpreted differently by Chinese leaders.

The widespread belief that China anticipates a U.S. military response is notable given that most respondents also think Beijing is uncertain about its capabilities vis-à-vis the United States. In the context of a Chinese amphibious invasion scenario in the next five years, about 41 percent believe Beijing is uncertain about U.S. capabilities but think Beijing “has confidence in its growing military capabilities.” This reflects the fact that China has invested significant resources to train and modernize the PLA.  

At the same time, the PLA has not engaged in a major conventional conflict since the China-Vietnam war in 1979 and an amphibious invasion of Taiwan would amount to an extremely complex and difficult military operation. Most respondents (55 percent) consequently think that Beijing believes the United States still has a military advantage, indicating a belief that the United States and its allies could mount a considerable defense of Taiwan. Only 2 percent say that Beijing believes the United States could not repel a Chinese invasion.

Conclusion

The results of this survey offer valuable insights into the thinking of many of the leading experts on cross-Strait dynamics and Indo-Pacific security issues—including those who have shaped not only public discourse but also U.S. government policy. Taken together, their views suggest a consensus along the following lines:

1. China is determined to unify with Taiwan, but Beijing does not have a coherent strategy. Experts in the poll unanimously agree that Beijing will not accept Taiwan’s independence. At the same time, most experts assess that China does not have a coherent strategy for unification.
2. China is willing to wait to unify with Taiwan, and the August 2022 exercises are not an indicator of accelerated PRC timelines. Most respondents believe Beijing is willing to wait decades—or even indefinitely—to achieve its goals. Experts are split nearly evenly over whether China has set a hard deadline to achieve unification by 2049 or whether it is willing to wait indefinitely. Only a small share of experts believe China has a hard deadline to unify Taiwan in the next 15 years or less. Most do not view China’s unprecedented military exercise in August 2022 as an indicator that China has accelerated its timeline to use force against Taiwan.
3. Xi Jinping feels there are still avenues to peaceful unification. A large majority of experts believe Xi will prioritize making progress on peaceful unification during his third term (2022–2027). Few experts—and no former senior U.S. government officials—believe Xi has concluded that China has exhausted all peaceful options. Most respondents reject speculation that Xi intends to use force against Taiwan by 2027. 
4. The potential for a military crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait is very real. While very few think a full amphibious invasion of Taiwan is likely in the next ten years, a majority say it is possible. Other scenarios short of an invasion—such as a blockade or a military accident or collision—are likelier than not in the next decade. 
5. China would immediately invade if Taiwan declared independence. Experts were largely in agreement that a declaration of independence would provoke an invasion. China would respond more limitedly—but still negatively and strongly—to an ending of U.S. strategic ambiguity, likely by provoking a crisis.
6. China assumes that the United States would intervene in a Taiwan conflict. Experts in the survey unanimously agree that Beijing assumes the U.S. military would deploy forces to intervene and defend Taiwan in a conflict, and a slight majority of experts think Beijing still worries that the United States has a military edge. Accordingly, almost no respondents believe that ending the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity would deter China from using force against Taiwan, since Beijing already assumes Washington will intervene. 

Survey Participants

A total of 64 respondents participated in this survey. The individuals listed below gave permission to publicly acknowledge their participation. An additional four respondents participated but did not wish for their names to be listed publicly. 

Jeff Benson, Jude Blanchette, Dennis J. Blasko, Richard Bush, Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Elbridge Colby, Zack Cooper, Ralph Cossa, John K. Culver, Fiona Cunningham, Richard Danzig, Brian Davis, Gerard DiPippo, Lukas Filler, David Finkelstein, Michele Flournoy, M. Taylor Fravel, Bonnie Glaser, Michael J. Green, Derek Grossman, Kristen Gunness, Paul Haenle, Ryan Hass, Paul Heer, Lonnie Henley, Charles Hooper, Russell Hsiao, Michael A. Hunzeker, Christopher Johnstone, Shirley Kan, Ivan Kanapathy, Isaac Kardon, David Keegan, Scott Kennedy, William Klein, Matthew Kroenig, Roderick Lee, Kenneth Lieberthal, Bonny Lin, Shirley Lin, Oriana Skylar Mastro, Evan Medeiros, Lyle Morris, Dan Peck, Shelley Rigger, J. Stapleton Roy, David Sacks, Brent Sadler, Chad Sbragia, Andrew Scobell, David B. Shear, Thomas Shugart, David Stilwell, Mark Stokes, Robert Sutter, Scott Swift, Kharis Templeman, Christopher Twomey, James Winnefeld, Joel Wuthnow

Authors:
Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Matthew P. Funaiole, Samantha Lu, Hannah Price, Nicholas Kaufman

The post Surveying the Experts: China’s Approach to Taiwan appeared first on ChinaPower Project.

As U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi traveled to Taiwan on August 2-3, China responded with forceful and coercive military, economic, and diplomatic measures. Developments are still unfolding, but the large-scale and unprecedented military exercises taken by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) far exceed the operations China engaged in during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis that took place in 1995-1996. Chinese escalation has precipitated the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, leading to international calls for China to immediately halt its military activities. This page tracks and analyzes key Chinese actions, Click the links below to jump to a specific section of the page:

• Timeline of Key Chinese Military Activities
• Mapping the PLA’s Unprecedented Seven Exercise Zones around Taiwan
• The Significance of the PLA’s Exercises
• China’s 2022 White Paper on Taiwan

Timeline of Key Chinese Military Activities

Prior to Speaker Pelosi’s Arrival

In the leadup to Speaker Pelosi’s travel to Taiwan on August 2, the PLA took a series of actions to demonstrate its resolve and willingness to escalate, with the hope of deterring Speaker Pelosi from setting foot on the island and backing up China’s increasingly stern public warnings with action. This included military drills and operations across multiple theater commands, including to the north, west, east, and south of Taiwan.

• On July 28, China began testing Taiwan’s defenses by sending unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Taiwan’s Dongyin Island, a well-defended Taiwan outpost that is part of its Matsu Islands located close to mainland China. This marked the first time that China has sent drones over Taiwan’s airspace.
• By August 1, China placed the PLA Eastern Theater Command (ETC), which leads military operations against Taiwan, on high alert. There was significant movement of troops and equipment within the ETC in the regions closest to Taiwan. 

• The PLA further repositioned key military assets from other regions to the Eastern Theater Command. The PLA Navy’s two operational aircraft carriers, the Liaoning and Shandong, had previously deployed from their respective home ports of Qingdao and Sanya, and were moving in the waters around China. Large Chinese towboats were also spotted en route towards Taiwan. 
• China announced military exercises and live fire drills in the South China Sea from August 2–6. The PLA’s Southern Theater Command (STC)—which is responsible for operations in the South China Sea and some operations around Taiwan—was placed on high alert. 
• On August 2, PLA aircraft flew close to the Taiwan Strait centerline. A number of civilian flights at multiple airports in Fujian Province were canceled, suggesting that China was clearing the airspace in the Taiwan Strait to engage in military operations. 

All these activities caused speculation among Chinese netizens that the PLA may have been ready to engage in some military operation against Pelosi’s entourage if her plane flew the typical route to Taipei, traveling through the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait to reach Taipei. Although it is unlikely that China considered shooting down her plane or engaging in aggressive intercepts of her airplane—which could risk a deadly accident or miscalculation—it is possible that China may have wanted to send planes to “escort” her flight. The PLA may have also considered limited operations against U.S. or Taiwan planes accompanying her plane. 

Instead, her aircraft (and accompanying escorts) took a detour that avoided the PLA exercise in the SCS and flew to Taipei via the east of Taiwan. It would have been significantly more risky for China to engage in military operations to the east of Taiwan given the prepositioning of multiple U.S. military assets in the vicinity and the difficulty of supporting PLA operations at longer distances and during nighttime.

After Speaker Pelosi Landed in Taipei

After China failed to deter Speaker Pelosi from landing in Taiwan, the PLA rapidly transitioned to punishing Taiwan and exercising China’s capabilities to engage in a range of military operations against the island. This involved PLA live-fire rocket and missile launches on August 4 as well as significant joint military operations from August 4 to August 7. At the same time, China stepped up air intrusions against Taiwan’s offshore islands located close to China, namely Kinmen and Matsu. These actions were accompanied by an aggressive disinformation operation to exaggerate the extent and scale of China’s capabilities. Despite these efforts, and up until August 8, PLA aircraft have not intruded into the airspace of Taiwan’s main island and Chinese military vessels have stayed outside of the main island’s territorial waters.

The timeline below lists key Chinese actions starting after Speaker Pelosi’s arrival. The timeline reflects publicly available information as of 12 PM EDT on August 31.

Tuesday, August 2

• Shortly after Speaker Pelosi landed, China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) said that it is on “high alert” and will launch a “series of targeted military operations as countermeasures.” 
• Chinese state media announced that the PLA would conduct military exercises from August 4-7 in six zones throughout the Taiwan Strait and around the island of Taiwan. State media detailed that the exercises would include: a series of joint military operations around Taiwan; joint air and sea exercises in the sea and airspace of the northern, southwestern, and southeastern Taiwan Islands; long-range live ammunition firing in the Taiwan Strait; and test firing of conventional missiles in the waters east of Taiwan. Notices warned civilian and commercial traffic to avoid exercise areas. 
• At the same time, Taiwan’s MND refuted false Chinese rumors that Su-35 fighter jets crossed the Taiwan Strait when Pelosi’s plane entered Taiwan’s airspace. Instead, for August 2, the PLA flew 21 aircraft into the southwest portion of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), including 10 J-16 fighters, eight J-11 fighters, one KJ-500 airborne early warning and command (AEW&C) aircraft,¹ one Y-9 electronic warfare (EW) aircraft, and one Y-8 electronic intelligence (ELINT) aircraft.

Wednesday, August 3

• By Wednesday, the PLA began exercising in regions around Taiwan. The ETC announced that China had “organized joint combat training exercises in the northern, southwestern and southeastern waters and airspace” near Taiwan and the exercises involved most PLA elements under the ETC. The PLA focused on training for “joint blockade, sea target assault, strike on ground targets, and airspace control operation, and the joint combat capabilities of troops.” The actual extent of China's operations remain unclear: for example, Chinese media shared alleged videos of J-20 fighter jets taking off, but Taiwan’s MND clarified that no J-20s had operated in Taiwan’s ADIZ on August 3.
• Reports emerged that China had established a seventh zone for the exercises, located east of the island. It was set to last from August 4–8, meaning it would go one day longer than the six other zones.  
• The PLA flew 27 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. Six J-11 fighters and 16 Su-30 fighters crossed the Taiwan Strait median line and six J-11 fighters flew into the southwest corner of Taiwan’s ADIZ. 
• Two Chinese UAVs penetrated the airspace over Taiwan’s Kinmen Islands, located just off the coast of mainland China. This marked the first time PLA drones have done so. Taiwan’s Kinmen Defense Command responded by firing flares to warn the drones to leave Taiwan's airspace.

Thursday, August 4

• The PLA began exercises in the designated zones. China launched long-range rockets and conventional ballistic missiles from four main regions within China into multiple exercise zones to the north, east, and south of Taiwan. Japan’s MND reported nine missiles were fired by China into four exercise zones, while China and Taiwan reported 11 missiles, with some Chinese reports suggesting only three zones were hit. Video footage posted by official Chinese media suggested that at least some of the missiles were DF-15B short-range missiles. At least five missiles splashed down in Zone 4, on Taiwan’s east coast within Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Japan’s MND estimated that at least four of the missiles flew over the island of Taiwan—an unprecedented move by China. However, Taiwan downplayed the danger noting that the ballistic missiles flew in a high path more than 100 km and were therefore not within Taiwan’s airspace.
• The PLA fired missiles from Zone 1, near Taiwan’s Matsu islands, and fired long-range rockets near Matsu, Wuqiu, Dongyin, and other outlying islands, contributing to concerns in Taiwan of China’s intent around the islands. 
• China’s Eastern Theater Command said that it was mobilizing more than 100 fighter planes, bombers and other aircraft, as well as more than 10 destroyers and frigates, to “carry out joint closure and control operations.” Images showed military helicopters flying past Pingtan island, one of Taiwan's closest points to mainland China. China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, joined the exercises around Taiwan accompanied by at least one nuclear-powered attack submarine. 
• The PLA flew 22 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. This included 12 Su-30 fighters crossing the median line northwest of Taiwan and eight J-11 and two J-16 fighters crossing the median line southwest of Taiwan. 
• Taiwan reported that drones flew over the waters surrounding the Kinmen, Dongyin, and Matsu Islands on Thursday. UAVs were also spotted in the waters near Japan. During the morning and night, a Chinese reconnaissance drone and another reconnaissance/attack drone flew into the East China Sea, passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima and into the Pacific Ocean, and then turned to head south of the Sakishima Islands. They then turned and traced the same path in the opposite direction. Another presumed Chinese drone flew in from the East China Sea and flew circles over the area. The Japan Air Self-Defense Force scrambled fighters. 

Friday, August 5

• The PLA ETC announced it conducted air and sea combat drills to the north, east, and southwest of Taiwan to test troops’ joint combat capabilities. According to the Taiwan MND, the PLA dispatched 68 aircraft and 13 vessels as part of military activities around the Taiwan Strait. This included PLA assets crossing the median line that divides the Taiwan Strait. 
• The PLA flew 49 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ and across the median line. This included 24 Su-30 fighters and six J-11 fighters crossing the median line northwest of Taiwan and 10 J-16 fighters, seven J-10 fighters, one Y-8 EW aircraft, and one Y-8 ASW aircraft crossing the median line southwest of Taiwan. This was the second-highest number of aircraft ever recorded entering Taiwan’s ADIZ in a single day, superseded only by 56 aircraft on October 4, 2021. More broadly, PLA ADIZ incursions averaged nearly 26 aircraft per day between August 2–8, a major uptick from an average of roughly three aircraft per day from January 1–August 1, 2022.
• Four PLA drones flew over the waters around Kinmen Island and nearby Lieyu Island and Beiding Islet. In response, the Kinmen Defense Command fired warning flares to repel the drones. Around the same time, similar aircraft were detected flying over Liang Island and Dongyin Island, which are part of Taiwan’s Matsu Islands.

Saturday, August 6

• On the third day of exercises, the PLA focused on testing troops' land attack and sea assault capabilities with joint air and naval operations in the sea and airspace to the north, east, and southwest of Taiwan. These missions aimed at clearing paths for amphibious landing forces to launch beach assaults against Taiwan. PLA ETC naval forces deployed warships, warplanes, and coast-based anti-ship missiles. Taiwan’s MND reported multiple PLA vessels (later numbered at 14 ships) around the Taiwan Strait, with some having crossed the median line and some possibly simulating attacks against "HVA" (high-value assets).
• China’s Maritime Safety Administration announced zones in the Yellow Sea where exercises would take place from August 5–15. China also announced exercises in the Bohai Sea set to start Monday, August 8, and last until September 8. 
• The PLA flew 20 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. This included 10 Su-30 fighters and four J-11 fighters crossing the median line northwest of Taiwan and four J-16 fighters, one Y-8 ASW aircraft, and one Y-20U aerial refueling aircraft flying into the southwest portion of Taiwan’s ADIZ. 
• Six PLA drones flew over waters around Kinmen and Beiding Islet. 

Sunday, August 7

• On the scheduled final day of the exercises, Taiwan’s MND reported 14 PLA Navy vessels and 66 PLA aircraft in the area. The PLA ETC said it conducted live-fire drills in the waters and airspace around Taiwan "as planned."
• While exercises in the initial six zones were set to end, the seventh zone (later added and reported by Taiwan’s government) would continue until Monday. 
• A commentator on Chinese state television said the Chinese military would now conduct "regular" drills on the Taiwan side of the line, largely confirming fears that China was aiming to use the exercises to shift the status quo and make recent unprecedented moves the norm. 
• The PLA flew 22 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. This included 10 Su-30 and four J-11 fighters crossing the median line northwest of Taiwan and six J-16 fighter, three H-6 bombers, and one Y-8 ASW aircraft entering the southwest area of Taiwan’s ADIZ. 
• During the morning, the PLA flew multiple drones in areas around the Taiwan Strait. In the evening, there was one batch of drones found around the Kinmen area. 

Monday, August 8

• China extended military operations around Taiwan by announcing new military exercises to engage in “joint anti-submarine and sea assault operations.” There was no publicly announced exercise restriction zone and no live-fire. Taiwan’s MND reported 13 PLA Navy vessels and 39 PLA aircraft were detected in the areas around Taiwan. 
• Taiwan’s MND shared that between August 1 and August 8, China engaged in multiple cyberattacks against Taiwan political and military targets and 272 attempts at political warfare and disinformation. Chinese disinformation attempts peaked on August 4 and 5. 
• The PLA flew 21 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. This included eight Su-30 fighters, six J-11 fighters, two JH-7 fighter-bombers, four J-16 fighters, and one KA-228 ASW aircraft. 
• Matsu Defense Command reported spotting nine “unidentified light spots” presumed to be UAVs that passed over the Matsu area. The Matsu Defense Command fired flares as a warning signal. The PLA also flew one drone around Kinmen. 

Tuesday, August 9

• China continued exercises that focused on joint containment and joint support operations, such as aerial refueling and sea support. Taiwan’s MND reported a total of 45 PLA aircraft and 10 ships detected around the Taiwan Strait, as joint air and sea operations continued. 
• The PLA flew 16 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ, all of which flew over the median line of the Taiwan Strait. Eight Su-30 fighters and four J-16 fighters flew across the northern portion of the median line. Four J-11 fighters flew across the central part of the median line, approximately due west of Taipei—the first time ADIZ incursions have taken place there.
• In response to China’s continuous exercises, Taiwan kicked off a two-day military exercise, known as Tianlei. It featured more than 700 troops and included live-firing of 114 artillery shells into the water.

Wednesday, August 10

• The PLA ETC announced that operations around the island had concluded. Senior Colonel Shi Yi, a spokesman for the ETC, regarded the recent exercises around Taiwan as successful, “with all tasks accomplished and the troops’ combat capabilities in integrated joint operations effectively verified.” However, the PLA will continue to monitor the region, conduct military training and preparations, and regularly organize combat patrols in the Taiwan Strait, as China intends to maintain its presence in the region. 
• As part of the PLA’s operations, the Taiwan MND reported 10 PLA Navy vessels and 36 PLA aircraft around the area of Taiwan. 
• The PLA flew 17 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ, all of which crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait. This included nine SU-30 fighters crossing near the center of the line (but further north than the preceding day’s incursion) and eight J-11 fighters crossing toward the southern portion.

Thursday, August 11

• Despite China’s official conclusion of the exercises around the island, Taiwan’s MND reported six PLA Navy vessels and 21 PLA aircraft around the island.
• The PLA flew 11 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. One JH-7 and six Su-30 flew over the northern portion of the median line and 11 J-4 aircraft flew over the median line to the southwest of Taiwan.

Friday, August 12

• Taiwan’s MND reported a total of six PLA Navy vessels and 24 aircraft in areas around the island of Taiwan.
• The PLA flew 10 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. Four Su-30 aircraft crossed the northern end of the median line. Four J-16 and two J-10 aircraft flew into the southwest portion of Taiwan’s ADIZ, near the median line.

Saturday, August 13

• The Taiwan MND reported six PLA Navy vessels and 29 PLA aircraft in areas around Taiwan.
• The PLA flew 11 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. This included six SU-30s crossing at the northern end of the median line and two J-10s crossing at the southern end of the median line, as well as four J-16s and one Y-8 ASW aircraft flying in the southwest portion of Taiwan’s ADIZ.

Sunday, August 14

• The Taiwan MND reported six PLA Navy vessels and 22 PLA aircraft in areas around Taiwan.
• The PLA flew 11 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. Four Su-30s crossed the median line north of Taiwan while two J-16s, two J-11s, and one KJ-500 AEW&C aircraft crossed the median line toward the southern end of the line.

Monday, August 15

• On Sunday, a U.S. congressional delegation—consisting of five lawmakers led by Senator Ed Markey—arrived in Taipei. In response, the PLA ETC announced Monday that it would begin “multi-unit joint combat readiness patrols and real-combat drills in the waters and airspace around the Taiwan Island.” Specific locations were not announced.
• In addition to the exercises around Taiwan, China’s Maritime Safety Administration announced that military exercises would take place from 12–6 pm on August 16 in an area covering approximately 47 square km off the coast of Guangdong Province in the South China Sea.
• The Taiwan MND reported five PLA Navy vessels and 30 PLA aircraft in areas around Taiwan.
• The PLA flew 15 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. Eight Su-30 and two J-11 fighters flew across the median line north of Taiwan and four J-16s crossed the median line toward the line’s southern end. A Z-9 ASW helicopter also flew east of the median line in an area north of Taiwan.

Tuesday, August 16

• The Taiwan MND reported five PLA Navy vessels and 17 PLA aircraft in areas around Taiwan.
• The PLA flew 10 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. Four Su-30 fighters crossed the Taiwan Strait median line on the northern end of the line and three J-11 fighters crossed the median line at its southern end. Two J-16 fighters entered the southwestern portion of Taiwan’s ADIZ and one Y-8 ELINT aircraft flew within the southeastern and southwestern portions of Taiwan’s ADIZ.

Wednesday, August 17

• The Taiwan MND reported five PLA Navy vessels and 21 PLA aircraft around Taiwan.
• The PLA flew five aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. Two Su-30 fighters crossed the median line at its northern end and two J-11 fighters crossed the median line at its southern end. A Y-8 ASW aircraft also flew in the southwest portion of Taiwan’s ADIZ.

Thursday, August 18

• After a relative lull in activity over the preceding week, Taiwan’s MND reported a significant jump in military activity around Taiwan. It reported 51 PLA aircraft operating around the island—the most since August 7 during initial large-scale exercises—and six PLA Navy vessels.
• The Taiwan MND also reported an uptick in ADIZ and median line incursions. The PLA flew 25 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. Twelve Su-30 fighters crossed the northern end of the median line and four J-10s crossed at the southern end of the median line. Six J-16 fighters were reported crossing the median line and in the southwest portion of Taiwan’s ADIZ; however, it is unclear how many of these six crossed the median line. Two H-6 bombers and one Y-8 EW aircraft also flew into the southwest portion of the ADIZ.

Friday, August 19

• After a significant spike of activity the previous day, the Taiwan MND reported a decline on August 19. Six PLA Navy vessels and 17 PLA aircraft were tracked around Taiwan.
• The PLA flew 10 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ—all of which crossed the median line. Four JH-7 fighter-bombers and two Su-30 fighters crossed at the northern end of the median line and two J-11 fighters crossed at the southern end.

Saturday, August 20

• The Taiwan MND reported five PLA Navy vessels and 17 PLA aircraft around Taiwan.
• The PLA flew 7 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. Two Su-30 fighters crossed the median line at its northern end and two J-11 fighters crossed at the line’s southern end. Two JH-7 aircraft and one Y-8 ASW aircraft flew into the southwest corner of Taiwan’s ADIZ.

Sunday, August 21

• Governor Eric Holcomb of Indiana arrived in Taiwan for a four-day visit that was followed by a visit to South Korea as part of an “economic development trip,” making him the first Indiana governor to travel to Taiwan in 17 years. Holcomb met with Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu Jau-shieh, Minister of Economic Affairs Mei-hua Wang, semiconductor companies, and President Tsai Ing-wen. In response to Holcomb’s visit, China’s Foreign Ministry lodged a “stern representation,” a phrase China uses to express its diplomatic discontent.
• Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported five PLA Navy vessels and 12 PLA aircraft operating around Taiwan.
• The PLA flew 5 aircraft across the median line and into Taiwan’s ADIZ. Two Su-30 fighters crossed at the line’s northern end and two J-10 fighters and one Y-8 ASW aircraft crossed at the line’s southern end. 

Monday, August 22

• Taiwan’s MND reported five PLA Navy vessels and 15 PLA aircraft operating nearby.
• The PLA flew 11 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. Two Su fighters crossed the median line at its northern end and two J-10 fighters crossed at the line’s southern end. An additional two J-11s, two JH-7s, one J-16, one Y-8 ASW aircraft, and one Y-8 RECCE (reconnaissance) aircraft flew into Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ.

Tuesday, August 23

• Taiwan’s MND reported four PLA Navy vessels and 20 PLA aircraft operating near Taiwan.
• The PLA flew 9 of the aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. Three Su-30 fighters crossed the Taiwan Strait median line at its northern end and two J-11 fighters crossed at the southern end. An additional Y-8 ASW aircraft was detected in Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ.

Looking to go deeper on the military dimensions of the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis? The China Power Project hosted a live event on this topic, featuring a panel of experts. Watch a recording of the event here.

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Wednesday, August 24

• Taiwan’s Penghu Defense Command conducted live-fire exercises on the Penghu Islands. During the exercise, M60A3 tanks conducted counter-amphibious landing operations. Additionally, 155 mm howitzers fired live ammunition while 105 mm howitzers and 120 mm mortars changed positions after firing flares, and .50 caliber machine guns were used to practice shooting aerial targets.
• Taiwan’s MND reported four PLA Navy vessels and 13 PLA aircraft operating near Taiwan
• The PLA flew two Su-30 fighters into Taiwan’s ADIZ, both of which crossed the Taiwan Strait median line at its northern end. 

Thursday, August 25

• The Taiwan MND reported four PLA Navy vessels and 15 PLA aircraft operating around Taiwan. 
• The PLA flew two JH-7 fighter-bombers and three Su-30 fighters across the median line's northern end. The Su-30s were much closer to the center of the median line than the JH-7s. Four J-11 fighters also flew into the southwest portion of Taiwan’s ADIZ. 

Friday, August 26

• U.S. Senator Marsha Blackburn met with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen in Taipei as part of the third U.S. congressional delegation to visit Taiwan in August. The PLA ETC responded stating that in recent days it had “organized and conducted joint patrols and real-life combat exercises involving multiple units in air and sea areas near Taiwan island,” adding that, “These are normalized military operations organized in response to the changing situation in the Taiwan Strait.” China’s embassy in Washington also issued a statement that Beijing would take “resolute countermeasures,” to Senator Blackburn’s visit.
• PLA activity around Taiwan rose markedly as Taiwan’s MND reported eight PLA Navy vessels and 35 PLA aircraft operating near Taiwan.
• The PLA flew 18 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. Eight Su-30 fighters and three J-11 fighters crossed the Taiwan Strait median line at its northern end while four J-16 fighters crossed at the line's southern end. An additional three J-10 fighters flew within the southwest portion of Taiwan’s ADIZ.

Saturday, August 27

• Taiwan’s MND reported five PLA Navy vessels and 21 PLA aircraft operating near Taiwan.
• The PLA flew 13 aircraft into the southwest portion of Taiwan’s ADIZ. This included seven J-16 fighters, two J-10 fighters, and four H-6 bombers. This marked the first day since August 2 (prior to Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan) that PLA aircraft did not cross the median line. 

Sunday, August 28

• Taiwan’s MND reported eight PLA Navy vessels and 23 PLA aircraft operating near Taiwan.
• The PLA flew 10 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. Three J-11 fighters and one Su-30 fighter crossed the Taiwan Strait median line at its northern end. One WZ-10 attack helicopter crossed the center of the median line, west of Taipei. Two J-10 fighters crossed at the line’s southern end. Meanwhile, one Y-8 ASW aircraft and two J-16 fighters flew into Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ.

Monday, August 29

• Taiwan’s MND reported eight PLA Navy vessels and 37 PLA aircraft operating near Taiwan. 
• The PLA flew 12 aircraft across the median line and into Taiwan’s ADIZ. Eight Su-30 fighters crossed at the median line’s northern end while two J-11 fighters and two J-16 fighters crossed at the line’s southern end.

Tuesday, August 30

• Taiwan’s military fired live warning shots at three Chinese civilian drones flying in the airspace around Taiwan’s Kinmen Islands. Typically, Taiwan’s military fires only flares to ward off Chinese drones. This is the first instance where live fire was used to warn off a Chinese drone.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 11 PLA Navy vessels and 24 PLA aircraft near Taiwan.
• The PLA flew 8 aircraft through Taiwan’s ADIZ. Two Su-30 fighters crossed the median line on its northern end. Two J-11s, two J-16s, one JH-7 fighter-bomber, and one Y-8 ASW flew into the southwest portion of Taiwan’s ADIZ.
• Arizona governor Doug Ducey arrived in Taiwan, beginning a three-day trip to Taiwan, followed by a visit to South Korea to strengthen “Arizona’s well-established partnerships with the two Asian partners.” China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to this visit by stating that “China firmly rejects any official interaction between the US and Taiwan in any form and in any name.”

Wednesday, August 31

• Taiwan’s MND reported a significant uptick in PLA activity around Taiwan. Seven PLA Navy vessels and 62 PLA aircraft were reported in areas around the island. This marked the highest number of aircraft reported since August 7, when China’s large-scale exercises were still ongoing. 
• The PLA flew 15 aircraft into the southwest portion of Taiwan’s ADIZ, including nine J-16s, four JH-7s, one Y-8 ASW aircraft, and one Y-8 EW aircraft. No aircraft crossed the median line. 

Mapping the PLA’s Unprecedented Seven Exercise Zones around Taiwan

Of the various Chinese activities detailed above, the most significant to date is a series of large military exercises and live-fire drills that took place from August 4-7. As a whole, these exercises are much closer to the main island of Taiwan than prior ones, showcasing the PLA’s increased confidence in its capabilities to operate near Taiwan. The seven exercise zones are within Taiwan’s ADIZ and encircle Taiwan from multiple directions. Several exercise zones are far from the Chinese mainland and beyond the Taiwan Strait, venturing into Japan’s and the Philippine’s EEZ. Three of the exercise zones intrude into Taiwan’s territorial waters and lie dangerously close to Taiwan’s capital and key cities. It is also worth noting that these exercises were rolled out at once, while the exercises during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis took place in multiple stages from July 1995 to March 1996.

Statements by Chinese military analysts have made clear that the PLA chose the location of each exercise zone for specific purposes. Below are details on the importance of each zone to PLA operations and to Taiwan’s security. Click to expand details about each zone.

The Significance of the PLA's Exercises

These unprecedented exercises serve at least four main objectives. First, they are intended to impose political costs on Taipei and undermine morale and support for Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen among Taiwan’s public. Part of this involves making clear that Taiwan will bear the brunt of Chinese punishment for closer relations with the United States. Beijing hopes that this will drive a wedge between Taipei and Washington.

Second, these exercises are part of larger Chinese deterrence and signaling efforts toward the United States, Taiwan, U.S. regional allies, and the broader international community to demonstrate how capable and determined China is to exert control over Taiwan and enforce its One China Principle. The exercises involve direct costs for Japan, and to some extent the Philippines, because of PLA operations (and firing of missiles) within both countries’ claimed waters. PLA activities are also meant to deter countries from supporting Taiwan by showcasing how much China is willing to escalate. More broadly, the PLA exercise led to rerouting of commercial air and maritime traffic around Taiwan to avoid the exercise zones, demonstrating China’s ability to “control” activities near and around Taiwan.

The PLA’s decision to ambiguously extend (and then end) parts of the exercises also fit into China’s playbook for using military exercises for deterrence signaling. Science of Military Strategy, a relatively authoritative textbook published by China’s National Defense University, highlights PLA strategic thinking on the role of exercises in creating confusion and uncertainty. It states exercises can be directed at adversaries with the goal of “making them uncertain about our intentions and making it difficult to determine whether we are conducting routine training, maintaining close diplomatic relations, or taking the opportunity to move into actual combat operations, thereby causing psychological panic and conduct a deterrent effect.”

Third, these exercises allow the PLA to rehearse how to conduct a variety of military operations that could form part of a larger-scale military operation - such as seizing one of Taiwan’s offshore islands or PLA blockade or invasion of the main Taiwan  island - or a standalone operation by itself. This includes not only activities directed at Taiwan, but operations to prevent potential third country intervention in a China-Taiwan conflict.

Fourth, and longer term, Beijing aims to use the exercises to establish a new status quo in the Taiwan Strait. China is specifically seeking to erase the notion of the median line that divides the strait and aims to constrain PLA operations west of the line. China also seeks to establish a new normal in which the PLA no longer respects Taiwan’s claims to a separate airspace and territorial waters. These exercises are likely only the beginning of PLA operations close to and above Taiwan. 

China’s 2022 White Paper on Taiwan

On August 10, 2022, the Chinese government published a white paper titled “The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era.” The white paper has been under development for some time, and it was released to coincide with and mark the ending of China’s unprecedented August 2022 military exercises. As a result, it serves as a powerful Chinese messaging tool to explain why China escalated with military force and what to expect from China’s policy toward Taiwan moving forward, including further changes to come after China’s 20^th Party Congress, which is set to be held this fall.

The white paper sought to convey that China’s overall policy toward Taiwan has not changed—that China remains committed to peaceful unification and “one country, two systems” despite the escalation of military force against Taiwan. Even as the PLA seeks to establish a “new normal” of military operations closer to Taiwan, Beijing is trying to signal that China would prefer to resolve the Taiwan question without use of significant military force. In other words, the August 2022 exercises is an example of China having no choice but to use military force to fight Taiwan separatism and external interference.

A detailed reading of this new white paper, however, shows mixed messages about China’s willingness to use force. The white paper also reflects Beijing’s toughened positions against Taiwan, and it no longer contains guarantees that Taiwan can maintain its democracy or military post-unification.

What Is New in the White Paper

The white paper represents authoritative and official Chinese policy toward Taiwan under President Xi Jinping. It is the latest Chinese white paper on Taiwan that follows two prior white papers in 1993 and 2000. There are significant differences between the 2022 and 2000 white papers that reflect the influence of three Chinese leaders—Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping—on China’s Taiwan policy. The new white paper also demonstrates that cross-Strait dynamics and the balance of power have shifted drastically in the last two decades.

The 2022 white paper defines resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China’s "complete unification" as a "historic mission." Although Jiang and Hu have used the term complete unification to characterize the desired end state for Taiwan, both leaders generally placed more emphasis on peaceful or national unification in their speeches and white papers. Under Xi Jinping, there are increased references to complete unification. The 2000 white paper did not use the term historic mission and this term suggests Xi’s elevation of the importance of unification, the importance of making progress on unification, and linking of unification with "national rejuvenation,” which was also absent from the 2000 white paper.

The 2022 white paper clarifies that China’s national development and progress set the direction of cross-Strait relations (and unification). Broadly increasing people-to-people contacts and economic and cultural exchanges between the two sides is no longer sufficient to drive cross-Strait relations in the direction that Beijing wants. China must rely on its growing political, economic, technological, and military power to shape and coerce Taiwan’s trajectory. To some extent, this also suggests that China is not in a hurry or rush to achieve unification because its growing power could give China even more advantage in the future.

The new white paper specifies “use of force would be the last resort taken under compelling circumstances.” This sentence was an addition that was not in the 2000 Taiwan white paper or the 2005 Anti-Secession Law. Because China already engages in near daily military operations against Taiwan, this sentence likely refers to either kinetic or larger-scale use of military force, which Beijing demonstrated with its August 2022 exercises. Although this sentence suggests that China should be less willing to use significant military force, it must be paired with other portions of the white paper that warn of the dangers posed by active separatist forces on Taiwan and prominent external interference (namely, the United States). The document urges China to have the courage, skill, extensive unity, and solidarity “to mobilize all factors to fight,” with “fight” referring to leveraging the range of Chinese capabilities, including military means. In other words, there are likely to be more instances of “compelling circumstances” and, if diplomacy does not work, China may have to use military force.

In terms of what Taiwan can expect after unification, the new white paper writes that China's principles of peaceful unification and One Country, Two Systems “take full account of Taiwan’s realities and are conducive to long-term stability in Taiwan after unification.” The addition of long-term stability suggests that Beijing wants to avoid the “instability” it suffered from the massive protests in Hong Kong. Beijing must be able to impose a sufficient degree of control over Taiwan to ensure there is no repeat of Hong Kong in Taiwan. The document offers that, “Provided that China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests are guaranteed, after unification Taiwan will enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region.” This means that Taiwan’s autonomy is highly conditioned. This is a far cry from the 2000 white paper that laid out what Taiwan could enjoy after unification without stipulating the conditions under which Beijing might revoke such offers.

What Is Missing from the White Paper

The 2022 white paper is missing a host of key items that illustrate China’s toughening position against Taiwan and the degree of control Beijing will need to exert over the island:

• Most tellingly, the English version of the document does not mention the word “negotiate” when describing how the two sides can proceed to unification. It notes that there will be “consultations and discussions as equals.” The Chinese version of the white paper still uses “谈判” (negotiate)—but only in three areas—and there is no mention of “平等谈判” (negotiations as equals). The lack of explanation of what “as equals” means, and the refusal to link that term with negotiation, raise serious questions of how Beijing views Taipei and whether Taipei—or perhaps the specific DPP leadership—will be allowed any room for bargaining.
• Indeed, the 2022 white paper is missing this key passage from the 2000 white paper: “[N]egotiations should be held between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese KMT on a reciprocal basis and… talks between the two parties may include representatives from all parties and mass organizations of Taiwan.” The 2000 white paper also noted that "we [Beijing] have never spoken of negotiations between the ‘central and local authorities.’" The exclusion of that statement in the 2022 text raises key questions about whether Beijing will view the DPP (or any Taiwan party) as an equal or subordinate for unification talks. If it is the latter, Beijing may seek to impose its will on Taipei than allow for genuine negotiations.

The white paper only guarantees that Taiwan can maintain its own social and economic system under the One Country, Two Systems formula. Gone are assurances in the 1993 and 2000 white papers about a host of other rights that Taiwan could enjoy after unification that would allow the island to continue functioning as a vibrant democracy:

• Missing: Taiwan “will have its own administrative and legislative powers”
• Missing: Taiwan will maintain “an independent judiciary and the right of adjudication on the island”
• Missing: Taiwan “will run its own party, political, military, economic, and financial affairs”
• Missing: Taiwan “may keep its military forces and the mainland will not dispatch troops or administrative personnel to the island”
• Missing: “Representatives of the government of the special administrative region and those from different circles of Taiwan may be appointed to senior posts in the central government and participate in the running of national affairs.”

Instead, in Beijing’s ideal world, Taiwan would be governed by patriots who are loyal and subordinate to Beijing. The white paper makes this clear, concluding: “All Taiwan compatriots who support reunification of the country and rejuvenation of the nation will be the masters of the region, contributing to and benefitting from China's development.”

Authors:
Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Matthew P. Funaiole, Samantha Lu, Hannah Price, Nicholas Kaufman

The post Tracking the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis appeared first on ChinaPower Project.

China’s decision to tacitly side with Russia despite its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine renewed fears of a China-Russia military alliance. The two countries have so far eschewed a formal alliance, but they share deep military ties centering on arms sales and joint military exercises. Russian arms sales to China have been invaluable to China’s efforts to rapidly modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Joint military exercises have likewise aided the PLA and offered Beijing a suite of other benefits.

Yet military ties between Beijing and Moscow are not without considerable hiccups. China’s repeated theft of Russian technology is a major sore spot, and arms sales are becoming a less important focal point of the broader bilateral relationship. With respect to joint exercises, shifting power dynamics between China and Russia are upsetting the status quo with mixed results for China.

Military Aid and Arms Sales

Through the decades, cooperation on military technology has at times been an important and symbolic element of China-Russia relations. Politically, Russian military aid and arms sales have helped undergird the broader diplomatic relationship. Militarily, arms sales have provided the PLA with equipment that it struggled to produce on its own, like advanced aircraft, engines, and air defense systems. However, China has repeatedly stolen Russian technology and know-how, creating friction between Beijing and Moscow. Going forward, arms sales could become a less important area of the relationship or even become a point of contention as China advances and competes with Russia in the global arms industry.

The Ebb and Flow of Russian Military Aid and Arms Sales

Military aid and arms sales played a major role in cementing ties between the newly founded People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. After entering the Korean War in October 1950, China suffered heavy losses and turned to the Soviets for aid. In October 1951, Moscow agreed to provide massive amounts of equipment and assistance from Soviet experts. Soviet aid included around 700 MiG-15 fighter jets and 150 Tu-2 light bombers and effectively tripled the size of China’s air force fleet. In total, Chinese historical data suggests the Soviets provided the equivalent of $1.5–2 billion worth of aid during the war.

The Soviet Union also abetted China’s nuclear development, for both civilian and military purposes. Soviet aid included training Chinese scientists, supporting China’s weapons-grade uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, and assisting with warhead design and production and missile technologies. The Soviets, however, stopped short of directly providing China with nuclear weapons.

This massive influx of Soviet aid catalyzed China’s indigenous weapons production. Moscow encouraged and assisted Chinese production through licensing and technical support, and by 1956 China was producing the J-4, its first indigenous combat aircraft modeled on the Soviet MiG-17. China likewise leveraged Russian aid to eventually develop its first successful atomic bomb by 1964.

Yet this military cooperation did not last. By 1960, ideological and political differences resulted in the Sino-Soviet Split, which effectively lasted until the normalization of relations in 1989. During this period, the two countries ceased virtually all forms of military aid and arms sales.

Following the resumption of normal relations between Beijing and Moscow in 1989, arms sales again played a major role in strengthening political ties between the two sides. The Soviet Union was one of the only major arms-producing countries willing to sell weapons to China after the deadly crackdown on protestors in Tiananmen Square in 1989, which left Beijing an international pariah. The benefits were not one-sided. Chinese arms purchases were a lifeline for Russia’s defense industry in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse.

Russian arms sales to China burgeoned in the 1990s and early 2000s. Some of the most big-ticket purchases were of Russian fighter aircraft. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 1990 and 2005 China placed several orders for some 270 Su-27 and Su-30 fighters at a cost of approximately $10-11 billion.¹ In the years following the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis—during which China’s navy was outmatched by U.S. naval forces in the region—Beijing ordered eight Russian Kilo-class diesel-powered submarines and four Sovremenny-class destroyers.² China also bought thousands of missiles and several S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, among other equipment. Altogether, between 1990 and 2005, China purchased more than 83 percent of its arms imports from Russia.

As in the 1950s, this influx of major weapons systems in the 1990s and 2000s significantly aided the PLA by filling modernization gaps. Russia’s willingness to license production rights to China catalyzed the development of China’s own defense industry. By selling China kits of Russian aircraft parts, Chinese engineers gained manufacturing experience, which aided China in developing indigenous designs.

Problems in the China-Russia Arms Trade Relationship

After a flurry of orders, Chinese arms purchases from Russia slowed to a trickle in the late 2000s. China’s overall arms imports were down 30 percent during the 2007-2021 period compared to 1992-2006. Declining orders from Russia drove much of this fall. China has procured around 71 percent of its arms imports from Russia since 2007—a notable drop from 84 percent during the previous 15-year period.

This decline is partly the result of growing frustration with China’s repeated theft of Russian military technology and intellectual property through espionage and hacks. According to ChinaPower analysis, there have been at least 17 cases of Chinese espionage and hacking to steal Russian military technology during the last two decades. China has most heavily targeted Russian aerospace technologies. In 2004 alone, three court cases saw seven Russians convicted of providing China with information on Russian airplane and satellite technologies.

Espionage and hacks are only part of the story. China has frequently breached agreements with Russian arms suppliers by reverse-engineering Russian equipment to produce its own. China copied Russian Su-27 fighters to develop its J-11 fighter and it reverse-engineered S-300 SAM systems to produce its HQ-9 SAM systems. This has not gone unnoticed in Moscow. In 2019, Russian state-owned defense firm Rostec claimed that there had been 500 cases of unauthorized copying of its equipment in the preceding 17 years. In a rare move, the company publicly criticized China, stating that “‘China alone has copied aircraft engines, Sukhoi planes, deck jets, air defense systems, portable air defense missiles, and analogs of the Pantsir medium-range surface-to-air systems.’"

The relative decline in Russian arms sales to China is also largely due to China’s shrinking reliance on foreign-made equipment. Decades of growing defense spending and intensive efforts to modernize its defense industry have rendered China increasingly capable of producing its own advanced fighter jets, naval vessels, and other equipment.

China does notably still depend on Russian-made engines for many PLA aircraft. Over the last five years (2017-2021), aircraft engines accounted for more than 54 percent of China’s arms imports (by value), with the overwhelming majority coming from Russia. Some of China’s Chengdu J-20 stealth fighters are equipped with Russian Saturn AL-31 engines and versions of China’s developmental Shenyang J-35/FC-31 jet fighter have used Russian RD-93 engines.³

However, China appears to be making headway toward replacing Russian engines. A domestically built WS-10C engine is reportedly being used in variants of the J-20, and new variants of the J-35/FC-31 are likely to be outfitted with Chinese WS-13E engines. Over the next decade, both planes are expected to feature more advanced Chinese-made engines, including the WS-15 and WS-19. China also aims to phase out the Russian Soloviev D-30KP-2 currently powering China’s Y-20 large transport aircraft and H-6K bombers and replace them with Chinese WS-18 engines.

The Future of Russian Arms Sales to China

Going forward, several factors could render arms trade a source of contention and competition, rather than a platform for cooperation. The Chinese defense industry’s continued efforts toward self-reliance could result in the evaporation of Chinese arms purchases from Russia altogether. There has already been a marked slowdown in recent years. China last purchased military equipment (two orders of Mi-17 transport helicopters) from Russia in 2019—a far cry from earlier years when China placed more than a dozen orders in a single year.

Even if China does continue to purchase certain items, Russia may face challenges in supplying them. In 2020, Russia delayed delivery of its highly advanced S-400 SAM system to China, citing the Covid-19 pandemic as an excuse. However, the move was seen by some as a diplomatic move by Moscow to avoid angering India—Russia’s top arms buyer—amid heightened tensions and border skirmishes between China and India.

Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine could further inhibit Russia from delivering orders to China. After Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, international sanctions on Russia disrupted Russia’s ability to deliver certain equipment to Vietnam, one of Russia’s top arm export markets. The severe sanctions placed on Russia in response to its 2022 invasion of Ukraine could further disrupt the Russian defense industry and limit its ability to fulfill large orders to China or other customers.

Finally, if China pushes to establish itself as a more dominant player in the global arms market, it could put significant pressure on the broader China-Russia relationship. Russia’s prominence in the global arms market has already declined steeply. In 2021, Russian arms exports plunged to 11 percent of the global total—the lowest point in decades and a steep fall from a high of 32 percent in 2002. So far, China has not made major gains in capturing global market share due to steep competition from more established actors, including the United States and Russia. Nevertheless, China may be able to use Russia’s war in Ukraine to make marginal gains in regions like the Middle East and North Africa. In the long-term, Beijing could become a more attractive arms supplier as developing countries look to diversify their suppliers away from just Russia.

For now, arms sales will likely remain a slightly diminished but positive element of the relationship. As China’s capabilities and influence grow, however, this could change and may ultimately become a thorny issue in the bilateral relationship.

Joint Military Exercises

Unlike military aid and arms sales, which have waxed and waned over the years, joint exercises are a relatively new and thriving element of China-Russia military ties and a driver behind the strengthening of China-Russia relations in recent years. Joint military exercises provide China and the PLA with myriad benefits, such as operational experience and opportunities for deterrent signaling. These benefits could evolve or diminish, however, as China’s power grows and as Russia stagnates.

The Evolving Nature of China-Russia Joint Exercises

China and Russia first participated in a military exercise together in 2003. The multilateral exercise, dubbed Coalition 2003, featured a series of counter-terrorism drills and brought together 1,300 troops from China, Russia, and three other members of the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Two years later, China and Russia held their first bilateral military exercise, known as Peace Mission 2005, which began in the Russian far eastern city of Vladivostok and moved to China’s Shandong Peninsula. The exercise was a major undertaking involving 8,000 Chinese troops and 2,000 Russian troops conducting both land and amphibious maneuvers. Exercises such as these, consisting of large ground or multi-domain operations, were the norm during the early years of China-Russia joint exercises.

However, as China and Russia strengthened ties, they dramatically scaled up the number and type of exercises. In 2007, they conducted their first joint paramilitary exercise Cooperation 2007, focused on anti-terrorism drills, and in 2009 they held their first joint naval drills in the Gulf of Aden. Starting in 2014, China and Russia began to participate in large-scale competitions such as the Aviadarts air force competition and Tank Biathlon, both of which are now annual exercises. Since then, the two have further widened the aperture of their cooperation by participating in computer-based simulations and by conducting joint aerial patrols. Altogether, China and Russia participated in at least 78 joint military exercises between 2003 and mid-2022, with more than half of these taking place since 2016.

China-Russia joint exercises have also expanded in terms of geographic reach. Early exercises largely took place in the rugged terrains of western China and Central Asia, but more recent naval exercises saw the two operate in the distant waters of the South African coast, the Mediterranean Sea, and even as far as the Baltic Sea. Joint aerial patrols have likewise seen the two flying across broad swaths of the Western Pacific Ocean.

Mapping China-Russia Joint Military Exercises

This interactive map visualizes China-Russia joint military exercises that took place between 2003 and mid-2022. Bubbles indicate the approximate location of exercises and are colored based on exercise type. Exercises that took place in two locations have bubbles for both locations.⁴ View the full dataset that drives this map here.

Please view the map on a desktop computer for best results.

How China Benefits from Joint Exercises with Russia

China reaps many benefits from joint exercises with Russia. First and foremost, joint exercises have allowed the PLA to gain valuable experience operating with the far more experienced Russian military and afforded the PLA opportunities to practice maneuvering in a variety of geographies and climates far from China’s borders. These experiences are invaluable to the PLA, which has not engaged in large-scale military conflict in several decades.

Joint exercises provide additional benefits to China (and Russia) as a tool for sending political signals and deterring perceived adversaries. Chinese officials have long claimed that joint exercises do not target “third parties”; however, the 2020 edition of Science of Military Strategy—an authoritative textbook published by China’s National Defense University—states that an exercise “not only demonstrates the Chinese army’s combat capabilities to adversaries, but also causes doubts, making them uncertain about our intentions.”

In recent years, China and Russia have increasingly exploited joint exercises to signal to the United States and its allies. In September 2016, just two months after the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that invalidated China’s claims over much of the South China Sea, China and Russia launched Joint Sea 2016, which featured island seizure operations in the South China Sea. It was their first and only naval exercise held there, sending a clear signal that it was a response to the tribunal’s ruling. More recently, in May 2022, China and Russia conducted a joint aerial patrol over the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea that coincided with a summit of the leaders of the Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue (also known as the Quad) in Tokyo. The move was widely seen as a direct response and intentional provocation in protest of the summit.

Beijing also aims to use the exercises to positively signal to friends and neighbors. More than half of China-Russia exercises are multilateral. SCO members states and other neighbors participate in the lion’s share of these. These exercises help to both level up the military capabilities of these countries while also helping to assure them that China and Russia have the capability and will to aid them in addressing regional security threats. They also aim to ease worries in neighboring countries about Beijing’s own intentions, making the exercises an important element of China’s peripheral diplomacy.

Finally, joint military exercises help to strengthen the broader bilateral relationship by facilitating exchanges at multiple levels. The recent Zapad/Interaction 2021 exercises were viewed by Chinese experts as being unique in that the two sides not only jointly conducted the exercise but also collaborated in planning and commanding the exercises. More broadly, exercises have provided opportunities for Chinese military leaders—including vice chairs of China’s Central Military Commission and defense ministers—to meet with their Russian counterparts.

On top of this, exercises increase mutual trust and transparency by revealing to each other their respective capabilities. At Zapad/Interaction 2021, more than 80 percent of China’s equipment used in the exercise was new—including the PLA’s KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft, J-20 and J-16 fighters, Y-20 transport planes, and surveillance and combat drones—giving Russia a look at some of China’s most advanced systems.

The Shifting Dynamics of China-Russia Joint Exercises

The benefits that China gains from joint exercises with Russia are changing as China-Russia power dynamics shifts. Chinese analysts increasingly emphasize China’s military capabilities are catching up with, or surpassing, Russia’s. One expert argues, for example, that Chinese battalion groups have surpassed their Russian counterparts in terms of weapons and equipment and that Russian battalion tactical groups “are only suitable for the kind of battlefield in East Ukraine… and are easily defeated on high-intensity battlefields by advanced adversaries like the U.S. military.”

China has even started to lead some exercises while Russia participating from a more junior position. Official Chinese media described the Zapad/Interaction 2021 exercises as the first in which the PLA led, as well as the first joint exercises held entirely in China using mostly Chinese weaponry. Li Shuyin, a researcher at the Academy of Military Sciences, emphasized the uniqueness of Zapad/Interaction 2021 describing it as “a change of roles” and a chance to create a joint exercise “brand” centered on the PLA.

This emerging dynamic is likely to be cemented as China’s power grows and Russia stagnates. Russia’s war in Ukraine may accelerate this trend. The Russian military has surprised many by how poorly it has performed in Ukraine, and the conflict has proven costly and deadly for Russia. If Russia becomes deeply weakened and overstretched by the war, it may scale back some large-scale exercises. This may lead China to pivot toward smaller-scale exercises that are focused less on operational benefits and more on political signaling. The two sides could also continue with frequent exercises but with China more consistently leading as the senior partner.

Alternately, if Beijing concludes that Russia’s performance in Ukraine has been bad enough and the costs of a closer relationship with Russia outweighs the benefits, it is possible that China could rethink the value of participating in joint exercises with Russia. However, a major deterioration of the China-Russia military relationship would be dependent on a Chinese reassessment that the overall value of strategic ties with Russia has declined—an outcome that does not yet seem likely.

Authors:
Brian Hart, Bonny Lin, Matthew P. Funaiole, Samantha Lu, Hannah Price, Nicholas Kaufman, Gavril Torrijos

The post How Deep Are China-Russia Military Ties? appeared first on ChinaPower Project.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has cast a spotlight on the China-Russia relationship. On February 4, 2022, just weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin met and issued a historic joint statement which stated their bilateral relationship has “no limits” and that “there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation” between them.

The two countries have indeed significantly strengthened their relationship in recent years. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin enjoy close working relations, which drives high-level cooperation. The two sides also cooperate based on shared threat perceptions that the United States and its allies seek to encircle and undermine them. Close military ties and complementary economic dynamics help cement their relationship.

Yet the China-Russia relationship is complex and comes with costs for both sides. Leaders in Beijing and Moscow appear to have assessed for now that the benefits outweigh the costs, but that calculus could change. In the sections that follow, this ChinaPower feature analyzes three key weaknesses of the relationship:

• Historical and structural factors engender strategic mistrust between Beijing and Moscow;
• Russian stagnation renders Moscow a less useful partner and contributes to a growing power asymmetry; and
• Russian military aggression sparks blowback for China and exacerbates Russia’s stagnation.

Historical and Structural Factors Create Strategic Mistrust

Despite the strengthening of relations between Beijing and Moscow in recent years, considerable strategic mistrust exists between the two countries. Chinese strategic mistrust stems partly from the checkered history between the two countries, which saw the more powerful Russian Empire and the Soviet Union take advantage of a weaker China. For Russia’s part, enduring structural factors—especially geography—stoke fears that an increasingly powerful China may encroach on its interests and take advantage of Russian weaknesses. Moscow’s concerns are heightened by a strategic culture that harbors deep-seated great power ambitions and chafes at being the junior partner in a relationship with China.

The present close relationship between China and Russia is a notable deviation from history, which often witnessed the more powerful neighbor taking advantage of the weaker country. In the 19^th century, the Russian Empire was party to many of the “unequal treaties” that compelled China to hand over territory, money, and other spoils to European powers. The 1858 Treaty of Aigun and 1860 Treaty of Peking were particularly harsh, forcing China to forfeit approximately 1 million square kilometers (km) of territory to the Russian Empire.

In the mid-20^th century, tensions between the newly founded People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union devolved into the Sino-Soviet Split, which lasted into the 1980s. The two countries’ longstanding border disputes were a central flashpoint of the period. In 1969, hostility along the border escalated to nuclear posturing and nearly resulted in large-scale conflict between the two communist powers. Moscow also pressed Beijing on other fronts, including criticizing Chinese repression in Tibet and indirectly calling for Tibet’s independence.

Following the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations in 1989, China and Russia officially resolved their longstanding border disputes and Moscow began expressing support or neutrality on sensitive Chinese issues like Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Nevertheless, Moscow’s decades of antagonism have remained a source of suspicion within China. The unequal treaties that Russia was partner to were central to China’s “century of humiliation,” which the Chinese Communist Party still draws on as a source of nationalistic energy. It is impossible to de-link Russia from that legacy. Many Chinese thinkers still view these historic incidents as indicators of Russia’s willingness to use its power to pursue its own interests at China’s expense, and many in China continue to be wary of Russia’s reliability as a strategic partner.

On top of historical factors, enduring structural factors generate friction in the relationship—chief among them, geography. China’s immediate proximity to Russia leads to competitive dynamics in areas along their shared periphery, most notably in the Russian Far East, Central Asia, and the Arctic. More fundamentally, China’s immense size and power make it a daunting neighbor in the event that relations between Beijing and Moscow sour.

Following the opening of the China-Russia border in 1988, China’s presence in the Russian Far East emerged as an irritant in the relationship. As China’s economy grew, Chinese workers and businesses flowed into the region. Many went into the agricultural sector. One study found that in 2018 Chinese citizens owned or leased approximately 350,000 hectares (3,500 square km) of farming land in the Russian Far East—approximately 16 percent of the total land used for agriculture. The presence of Chinese workers in the region stirred up anger among some Russians, with many complaining about Chinese workers stealing Russian jobs and exploiting Russian natural resources.

Concerns about China’s presence in the Russian Far East have waned somewhat in recent years, and China is broadly popular among the Russian public. According to the Pew Research Center, 71 percent of Russians said they viewed China positively in 2019—the highest of all 35 countries surveyed. However, China’s presence in the Russia Far East continues to provoke negative views. A 2017 poll by the Russian Academy of Sciences found that more than one in three Russians view China's increasing presence as “expansion.” Half of respondents said that China threatened Russia's territorial integrity, and one-third of them believed that China’s policies endanger their country's economic development. This negative local sentiment has at times stalled planned Chinese investment projects, such as a Chinese-funded water bottling plant in the Irkutsk region, which was suspended after local protests in 2019. 

China and Russia also face competitive dynamics in their shared backyard of Central Asia, which could become a source of tensions. Moscow remains influential in the five former Soviet states of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and it considers the region to be within its “privileged sphere of influence.” Russia has thus far been willing to accept China’s activities there, for example, by cooperating with Beijing in the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization and by not opposing China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) ambitions. Russia currently even reaps some benefits out of China’s presence in the region: China’s considerable economic engagement there helps to facilitate regional stability and development allowing Russia to focus more on shaping military and security dynamics.

However, China is stepping up its security and economic footprint in Central Asia in ways that may increasingly be perceived through a competitive lens by Moscow. In 2021, it was announced that China would construct an outpost for police special forces in Tajikistan. While it appears that Chinese forces will not be stationed there, China’s move was seen by some as an encroachment on Russia’s ties to Tajikistan, which is a member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (a rough analogue to NATO comprising former Soviet states) and home to Russia’s largest overseas military base.

On the economic front, China has rapidly replaced Russia as the larger trading partner of all five Central Asian states. In 2000, Chinese imports from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan totaled less than one-fourth of Russian imports, but by 2020 they were more than double Russia’s imports. China’s exports have ballooned as well, with $19.3 billion worth of Chinese goods destined for Central Asia in 2020. As this trend continues, it threatens to undercut Russia’s ability to wield its economic influence in the region.

Click to enlarge.

Finally, Russia is wary of Chinese ambitions in the Arctic, where Moscow has significant interests. Approximately one-fifth of Russia’s expansive territory is located within the Arctic Circle. This area encompasses more than 24,000 km of shoreline and is home to some 2.5 million people. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has made the Arctic a key region of focus, including reviving Russia’s military presence there. In recent years, Russia has refurbished 50 previously closed Soviet-era military posts, including 13 air bases, 10 radar stations, 20 border outposts, and 10 integrated emergency rescue stations.

Despite lacking territory in the arctic, China has pushed to establish itself as a “near-Arctic state,” and in a 2018 white paper on the arctic, China put forward a vision for building a “Polar Silk Road” to complement the broader BRI. China and Russia have so far cooperated on energy and infrastructure projects in the region, but there have been considerable setbacks. Russia initially opposed allowing China onto the multilateral Arctic Council as an observer, and Moscow continues to be suspicious of Beijing’s strategic goals in the region. In 2012, Russia blocked Chinese research vessels from conducting surveys along the Northern Sea Route, and in 2020 Russian prosecutors charged a prominent Russian Arctic expert with treason for passing classified information to China.

In the future, Russia may feel the need to push back against China’s growing influence in these areas. In the spirit of the Chinese idiom “一山不容二虎” (one mountain cannot tolerate two tigers), China may also assert its interests over Russia’s as it pushes to shore up its regional and global power. So far, China and Russia have managed to compartmentalize competition in these areas, and they have succeeded in strengthening relations despite their turbulent history. Yet the seeds of mistrust remain planted within the relationship and could someday grow into a major impediment in the relationship.

Russian Stagnation Exacerbates Tensions

China and Russia have long sought to cast themselves as equal partners, but this narrative is increasingly difficult to maintain given the growing power asymmetry between the two. As Russia stagnates or even declines, and as China continues to bolster its national power, Russia is poised to be a less useful partner to China in countering Western influence. China’s growing lead over Russia could also exacerbate existing tensions and mistrust between Beijing and Moscow if Russia feels it is being disrespected or treated as a junior partner.

Across virtually all elements of national power—including economic, technological, and military power—China is surging ahead of Russia or rapidly catching up. Economically, China has already far surpassed Russia. On a nominal basis, the Chinese economy was nearly 10 times larger than Russia’s in 2021.¹ For the first time, China even surpassed Russia in nominal per capita GDP in 2020 (though Russia remains ahead of China when adjusted for purchasing power parity). The gap is set to widen significantly in the coming years. Economic forecasts by the International Monetary Fund expect China's GDP to climb toward nearly $30 trillion by 2027 while Russia's GDP is forecasted to stall at well under $2 trillion.

Russia’s stagnating economic growth is rendering it less important as an economic partner. In 2020, Russia only accounted for about 2 percent of China’s total trade (imports and exports). By comparison, China was Russia’s largest trade partner, accounting for about 18 percent of Russia’s trade.

Long-term trends will likely render Russia even less economically relevant for China. Russia’s current value to China is in supplying energy, with oil, gas, and coal collectively accounting for two-thirds of Russia’s exports to China. Barring a major paradigm shift, Russia will decline in importance in the coming decades as China weens itself off fossil fuels. This trend is already in the works. In 2010, oil and coal made up nearly 87 percent of China’s energy consumption. In 2020, that figure had dropped to less than 76 percent. Similarly, renewable energies made up approximately 16 percent of China’s energy consumption—up from about 9 percent in 2010.

Russia would face enormous headwinds in transitioning toward a more balanced and competitive economy since Russia lags far behind China and other global leaders when it comes to technological power and sophistication. In 2020, China spent 14 times more on research and development (R&D) than Russia. This was not simply the result of differences in economic size: China also spent more than twice as much as Russia as a percent of GDP.

Across the board, Russia lacks the science and technology ecosystem needed to produce the kinds of products that would make it a more valuable and dynamic economic and technological partner for China in the long-term. The Global Innovation Index, a leading index measuring innovative capabilities and performance, ranked China 12^th globally in 2021, just behind France and ahead of Japan. Meanwhile, it ranked Russia 45^th alongside Vietnam (44^th) and India (46^th).

Russian stagnation on the economic and technological fronts is weighing on its military power, which has traditionally been a key source of its strength and influence. In 2021, Russia spent virtually the same on its military as it did in 2014 (about $64 billion). China’s military budget grew over 47 percent during that period, from $183 billion to $270 billion.²

This has multiple implications for China. In recent decades, Beijing has looked to Russia as a major military partner in competing with the United States and its allies, but Russia’s faltering defense spending is weighing on China and Russia’s collective capacity to compete militarily. In 2021, the United States and its NATO and Indo-Pacific allies collectively spent 3.7 times more on defense than China and Russia. More concretely, Chinese experts have complained about the state of the Russian military, highlighting, for example, that the Russian naval fleet largely comprises outdated Soviet-era vessels and equipment.

It is unclear whether, or at what point, the power disparity between the two countries would threaten their relationship. If Russian power wanes and Western isolation of Russia continues, Moscow may conclude that it has no choice but to bandwagon with China. However, given Russian perceptions of itself and its history as a great power, Russia may be unwilling to have a close partnership with China that is not built on equality.

There are signs that some Russians are already wary of being treated poorly by China. In March 2022, former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev described China’s leaders as “ruthless businessmen” and said “China will never take [Putin] as an equal partner or even as ally." If Russian leaders feel that they are being taken advantage of or treated like the junior partner, they may ultimately choose to cool relations with Beijing and limit cooperation. Russia may even assess at some point that the power imbalance has become so severe that China poses a direct challenge or threat to Russia, which could result in a full pivot away from China.

Russian Aggression Runs Counter to Chinese Interests

Compounding these issues is Russia’s persistent military aggression on the world stage. Russia’s numerous military interventions—especially its ongoing war in Ukraine—have created political and economic blowback for China. On top of that, Russia’s war in Ukraine has weakened Russia, diminishing its utility to China and further exacerbating the widening power gap between China and Russia..

Chinese strategists and analysts have contrasted Russia’s willingness to use force with China’s forbearance. Some have described Vladimir Putin as a “revolutionary” seeking to overturn the existing international order and noted that Moscow’s goals render it more willing to use violence to advance its interests. By comparison, Chinese scholars have characterized China as having the more modest goal of rendering the existing international system more conducive to China’s growth and development—and therefore less willing to resort to force.

Russia’s willingness to use aggression has put China in politically awkward situations. Chinese officials have long described territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries as a cornerstone of China’s foreign policy. Chinese officials and propaganda outlets frequently try to cast China as having never invaded or bullied other countries. Russia’s repeated invasions of other countries run in direct opposition to those principles.

China has at times gone so far as to subtly criticize Russian military aggression. In 2008, then-spokesman of China’s foreign ministry Qin Gang stated that China “expressed concern” over the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia during Russia’s war in Georgia. Mostly, China has sought to neither criticize nor directly side with Russia. Beijing, for example, has not recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia; nor has it recognized the breakaway Ukrainian territories of Donetsk and Luhansk or Russian claims over Crimea.

In the case of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Xi Jinping has gone farther by publicly legitimizing Russian security and sovereignty concern, but this has come at a political and diplomatic cost. In the United Nations, China was compelled to make unpopular votes that placed it among a small minority of countries. In March 2022, for example, 141 countries voted in the UN General Assembly in favor of a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, while China joined a minority of 34 other countries in abstaining.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has also propelled a rapid and significant improvement in relations between the United States and its European allies as they collectively counter Russia, and it has strengthened perceived fault lines between democracies and autocracies—unwelcome outcomes for China. In the United States, China’s tacit support for Russia has brought a spotlight to the China-Russia relationship, with 62 percent of people polled describing it as posing “a very serious problem.” In Europe, a key economic partner for China where Beijing has been pushing to gain influence, countries there have toughened their stance toward China. In April and May, China sent an envoy to meet with officials in eight central and eastern European countries with the hopes of improving ties, but China’s outreach was rebuffed.

The war in Ukraine has also inflicted economic pain on China. The global rise in energy prices sparked by the war led oil prices to spike in China—much as they did in other countries. According to Chinese customs data, the price of China’s crude oil imports rose to RMB 5,070 per metric ton in April 2022—up 37 percent from January 2022.

China and its companies are also facing the added burden of navigating Western sanctions on Russia. While China has not joined U.S. and European sanctions on Russia, and despite Beijing’s calls for companies to continue conducting business in Russia, many Chinese firms have paused or cut operations there. This includes major Chinese tech companies like computer-maker Lenovo, smartphone-maker Xiaomi, and drone-maker DJI.

As a result, China’s exports to Russia plummeted to RMB 24.1 billion in April 2022—down 53 percent from the recent high of RMB 52 billion in December 2021. Technology exports have been particularly hard hit. In March, laptop sales to Russia were down more than 40 percent and smartphones down by nearly two-thirds. In late May, five Chinese firms were told to stop construction of a Chinese-Russian liquefied natural gas pipeline, a key node in China’s “Polar Silk Road,” to avoid EU sanctions.

In addition to causing political and economic blowback, Russia’s wars threaten to further diminish Russia’s utility as a strategic partner for China. Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine created significant setbacks for the Russian military and its supporting defense industry. The war disrupted Russia’s ability to deliver weapons systems to Vietnam—one of Russia’s top arm export markets—which in turn contributed to a broader decline in Russia’s arms exports in recent years. During the 2016-2021 period, Russian arms sales around the world declined 24 percent over the previous six-year period, and its share of global arms sales fell from 25 percent to 19 percent. This undercut a notable benefit of the China-Russia relationship for Beijing, wherein Russia could wield its prominence as an arms exporter to influence countries—like Vietnam—with which China has tense relations.

Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine has had far more drastic consequences for Russia. Western sanctions have had substantial impacts on the Russian economy. Russia’s GDP is expected to shrink by 8.5 percent in 2022 and unemployment is expected to rise substantially. Russia’s military losses in Ukraine are also staggering. In June 2022, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley stated that the Russian military had already lost roughly 20 to 30 percent of its armored force in Ukraine, which he described as a “huge” and “significant” loss.

For now, Beijing has chosen to double down on its relationship with Russia despite these drawbacks. These developments nevertheless represent meaningful headaches for China. Russia is stagnating, and perhaps in outright decline, which could ultimately exacerbate existing mistrust between Beijing and Moscow and potentially render Russia of far less strategic value to China.

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